Reputation Management and the ‘Observer Effect’ in Persons with High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome by Gaynor, Danielle & Gaynor, Danielle
 University of East London 
Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology 
 
Assessment Proforma 
 
Please read the following candidate’s declaration, and tick the adjacent boxes to confirm that you 
have complied with each statement.  Then complete the cover sheet below in full.  Failing to do 
either will result in your assessment being delayed and/or returned to you for resubmission.  
Please raise any queries regarding this form with your academic tutor well in advance of 
submission. 
 
CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION 
 
I confirm that no part of this submitted material, except where clearly quoted and 
referenced, has been copied from material belonging to any other person (e.g., from 
a book, article, lecture handout, web site, or another candidate).  I am aware that it is 
a breach of university regulations to copy the work of another without clear 
acknowledgement, and that attempting to do so will render me liable to disciplinary 
proceedings. 
 Tick to confirm 
 X 
 
I confirm that, for Practical Reports, where appropriate and feasible, client consent 
for the writing up of clinical work has been sought and obtained.  If consent has not 
been sought and/or obtained I confirm that the reasons for this have been addressed 
in the body of the report. 
 
 
Tick to 
confirm 
NA 
I confirm that the word count cited below is accurate, and within the limit allowed for 
this type of assessment.  The count includes all words in the body of text, diagrams, 
tables and footnotes (though not the contents page, references or appendices).  I 
have presented the assessed work with page margins, line spacing, font size and 
page numbers as required in the relevant section of the assessment handbook. 
 Tick to confirm 
 X 
 
COVER SHEET 
UEL STUDENT NUMBER u1037623 
  
WORK TO BE ASSESSED 
(e.g., Year 1 Essay, Practical Report 3, SRR) Thesis 
  
SUBMISSION DATE 27th November 2013 
  
CURRENT ACADEMIC YEAR 2013-2014 
  
YEAR OF TRAINEE AT TIME OF 
SUBMISSION 
(i.e. Year 1, Year 2  or Year 3) 
Year 3 
  
FOR PRs ONLY:  YEAR OF TRAINEE  
WHEN CLINICAL WORK WAS CARRIED OUT  
  
WORD COUNT 31,993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reputation management and the ‘Observer Effect’ 
in persons with high-functioning autism 
and Asperger’s Syndrome. 
 
 
 
 
Danielle Gaynor 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements of the University of East London for the 
Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
Ψ 
 
 
 
November 2013 
 
 
 
 
Word Count: 31,993 
 
 
 
 
 
  i 
ABSTRACT 
The literature suggests that opportunities for reputation enhancement can elicit 
pro-social behaviour.  Public declarations of moral judgments can provide just 
such opportunities.  Even subtle surveillance cues have been associated with 
more disapproval of anti-social behaviour in typically developed and intact adults 
(Bourrat, Baumard et al., 2011). However this has not been tested in adults with 
autistic spectrum presentations.   
 
The current qualitative study explored these questions using a semi-structured 
interview incorporating a Retrospective Verbal Protocol, based upon an on-line 
social evaluation survey, which was simultaneously piloted for potential future use 
in quantitative research. Two groups of adults, with and without diagnoses of 
autistic spectrum presentations, evaluated behaviours in four social domains 
(‘moral’, ‘convention’, ‘disgust’, and ‘ambiguous’), using two sets of vignettes.  
One set had ‘eyes’ embedded in a logo (the other was plain).  Qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected. 
 
Thematic analysis and descriptive statistics suggest that both groups tended to 
perform similarly on the overall social evaluation tasks, with subtle differences 
appearing in some social domains and in consideration of some moderating 
factors.  However, the qualitative data suggests that the groups did not always 
use comparable strategies to reach similar conclusions. The current study 
appears to support theoretical social domain distinctions and predictions (e.g. 
Nichols, 2002; Leslie et al., 2006) that both explicit and implicit processing routes 
may be used in moral evaluation. 
 
‘Observer effect’ quantitative results were inconclusive, indicating that the pilot 
survey tool is inadequate in its current form. However, an interesting finding was 
the similar performance by both groups on the tasks.  Qualitative data suggests 
that participants from both groups were aware of and actively engage in 
reputation management.  For the ASP group this appears to challenge Theory of 
Mind theories of autism and assumptions about reputation issues.  These findings 
have potentially important theoretical and clinical implications. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the background literature regarding the ‘autistic spectrum’ construct 
and epistemological framework for the study will be presented, followed by the 
principal psychological theories of autism.  Two further areas of research are also 
relevant to the current study.  Literature concerning social cognition will be 
examined, focusing on the areas of moral reasoning and reputation management.  
These areas will be drawn together and the rationale and research questions for the 
study will be presented. 
 
1.1 Background and epistemological framework  
Please see Appendix 1 for the literature search strategy. 
 
Autistic spectrum presentations are defined as neuro-developmental conditions, in 
which the normal prenatal or early childhood development of neurological structures 
underlying particular functions is assumed to be disturbed by genetic or other 
biological factors.  As such, these presentations are presumed to be constitutional 
and inherent to the person.  Reflecting this view, the Diagnostic and Statistics 
Manual for Mental Disorders, 4th edition, text revision (DSM IV-TR) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) describes a triad of core diagnostic features in ‘classic 
autism’:  1) delays and difficulties in social development; 2) delays in the 
development of communication; and 3) restricted, repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviour patterns, interests and activities.  The DSM IV-TR uses the label ‘Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder’.  
 
Naming autism as a “spectrum of disorders” confers an appearance of bio-medical 
solidity.  However, the term actually describes a wide array of subjective experiences 
of autism (Jodlowski, 2009).  Moreover, as Baron-Cohen (2008) points out, this 
deficits-focused approach misses strengths that may also be seen.  Such an 
approach may also shut down other, more neutral or positive, enquiry and thinking.  
To reflect this heterogeneity of experience, the general term ‘autistic spectrum 
presentations’ (ASP) will be adopted in this thesis.   
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It has been proposed that scientific knowledge should be classified as a set of 
arguments, rather than as the enduring truth (Gross, 1990) and that diseases or 
conditions, like texts, are open to multiple interpretations (Morris, 1998), including 
those which highlight ‘difference’ rather than ‘illness’.  The mother of Amrit in New 
Delhi put it this way in her blog (Khurana, 2013): 
“Autism is not something I have. It is integral to who I am.  Autism is not 
a puzzle, nor a disease. Autism is a challenge. Autism is about having a 
pure heart and being very sensitive… It is about finding a way to survive 
in an overwhelming, confusing world… It is about developing differently, 
in a different pace and with different leaps”. 
 
So how do we, as clinicians and researchers, as fellow human beings, begin to think 
differently about autism, and more broadly, about what it means to be different?  This 
research aims to build upon previous work (Bartlett, 2010) seeking to broaden the 
frame for understanding ASPs by adopting a critical realist epistemological position.  
Critical realism sits somewhere between the extremes of positivist and social 
constructionist stances, while drawing on both positions (Lopez & Potter, 2001).  
Epistemologically, critical realism avoids the partiality of other frameworks.  Critical 
realism is also the least ontologically restrictive position (Bhaskar & Danermark, 
2006), allowing for the assumption that there are ‘things’ which exist in the world, 
and that data may tell us something about these things, without being seen as 
mirroring them directly (Harper, 2011).  It assumes that the precise nature of the 
objects of inquiry and the ways they interact may be discovered on a case-by-case 
basis and that there may be many levels to ‘reality’.  Thus, critical realism has been 
said to be ‘maximally inclusive’ through its ability to draw on the insights of other 
theoretical stances while avoiding their shortcomings.  Methodologically, the critical 
realist stance allows the researcher to use ontological pluralism to move beyond 
reductionism and anti-reductionism by allowing reference to several levels of reality 
(Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006).  For these reasons, Bhaskar and Danermark (2006) 
suggest that critical realism is a useful tool to move beyond the established 
reductionist view of ‘disability’ to “a more positive concept of the object of disability 
research” (p. 280). 
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Applied to the areas explored in this research, critical realism allows us to accept 
that a thing exists and has agentive qualities.  These qualities lead to the behaviours 
and ways of being associated with the thing, which may only be investigated as 
manifested within a given context.  Critical realism thus simultaneously allows for 
different meanings to become attached to the object1 in question, depending upon 
the context within which the object is examined.   In the current research, it is 
proposed that there are underlying processes, which shape the concepts of ‘autism’, 
‘reputation management’, ‘morality’ and ‘moral evaluation’.  It is important to hold in 
mind, however, that definitions of these terms would necessarily fall within the 
bounds of language, culture and politics, all of which will affect how their 
manifestation, whether behavioural, linguistic or interactional, is understood. 
 
The researcher’s position is that individuals defined as having autistic spectrum 
presentations may receive and process social information differently, although such 
differences may be constructed as ‘disability’ within a contemporary Western society.  
Neither the extreme reductionist (‘autism’ as ‘deficit’) nor constructionist (‘autism’ as 
an artefact constructed by society) views would allow for the multiplicity of views, 
which enables the value of difference to emerge.  Both may equally be seen as 
keeping to the search for ‘normality’, either through reduction or expansion.  By 
holding a critical realist stance, the researcher aims to explore what may be 
underpinning processes, while leaving behind a polarised ‘all or nothing’ view.  It is 
hoped that such a perspective will allow ‘difference = disability’ to become simply 
‘difference’ in approaching this topic, by accepting human diversity. 
 
1.2 Autistic Spectrum Presentations 
1.2.1 Historical background and concepts 
1.2.1.1 Classic autism 
Parnas and Bovet (1991) wrote:   
                                            
1 ‘object’ here refers to any category of ‘thing’, whether physical objects or 
conceptual objects. 
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“When autism is conceptualised according to the objectivist descriptive 
model of medicine, it progressively disintegrates, because it defies any 
simple and operational formulation in this model” (p.18). 
 
As will become apparent through this outline of the history of the concept, ‘autism’ 
appears elusive, regardless of the framework applied.  Although some speculate that 
autism has existed for centuries (in various guises), the concept as we know it today 
emerged as a part of a wider debate between the competing psychoanalytic and bio-
medical psychiatric research communities (Jodlowski, 2009).  The term ‘autism’ was 
first coined in 1911 by Bleuler to describe the ‘aloneness’ he believed to underlie the 
experience of schizophrenia.  Aspects of this ‘aloneness’ included isolation, 
emotional indifference, idiosyncratic beliefs and values, inappropriate behaviours 
and irrational thinking.  The notion of autism as a ‘schizophrenic defence 
mechanism’ was adopted by the psychoanalytic research community and framed 
much of the early investigations and writing on the subject in the early 20th century.  
Vague operationalisation, however, such as ‘lack of natural attitude’ or ‘loss of the 
vital contact with reality' hindered researchers’ efforts and led to difficulties in 
diagnosis (Parnas & Bovet, 1991, p. 13).  It has been reported that it is unclear from 
Bleuler’s own writing whether he believed autism to be a symptom of schizophrenia 
or a disorder in its own right (Jodlowski, 2009). 
 
A new direction for the concept of autism and autism research emerged when the 
term was later applied by Kanner (1943), and independently by Asperger (1944), to a 
particular behavioural phenotype seen in some of their paediatric patients.  Both 
originally conceptualised what Kanner referred to as ‘infantile autism’ as a distinct 
personality disorder, rather than as a feature of schizophrenia.  Kanner noted that 
among his patients the symptoms arose in conjunction with particularly cold and 
distant parents.  This observation gave rise to the notion of the ‘refrigerator mother’, 
unable or unwilling to meet her child’s affective and attachment needs, championed 
by Bettelheim (1967) and others in the 1950s, as an aetiological explanation for 
autism.  This hypothesis has since been largely rejected. 
 
However, Kanner (1943) also proposed an alternative hypothesis, that of a biological 
aetiology, on the basis that the early developmental history of the children forced him 
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to assume that they were born with an innate inability to form the usual emotional 
bonds with other people (Kanner, 1943).  In his follow-up of the children, Kanner 
(1971) reviewed his earlier thinking.  In particular, he regretted that his biological 
hypothesis had been largely overlooked by the wider psychiatric community.   
 
Asperger’s own observations of four boys showing similar symptoms led to his 
identification of a condition, which he named ‘autistic psychopathy’2.  Important 
differences, however, distinguish Asperger’s description from that of Kanner.  He 
reported an eccentricity or oddness (despite being socially capable) which gave the 
boys’ behaviour a gauche quality in comparison with the norm (Asperger, 1944), 
reflecting the more able end of what is today seen as a spectrum of disorders.   
 
Neither of the first two editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) included autism as a distinct diagnostic category and to quote 
Kanner (1971, p. 141), “children so afflicted are offered item 295.80 (“Schizophrenia, 
childhood type”) as the only available legitimate port of entry”.  With its inclusion in 
the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), ‘infantile autism’ achieved the 
status of an ‘illness’ in its own right, having the ‘triad of impairments’ of delayed 
language acquisition, difficulty in social interaction, and restricted or repetitive 
behaviour (Wing & Gould, 1979) as core diagnostic criteria.  Autism became a 
‘pervasive developmental disorder’ when the diagnostic category was expanded in 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) to cover a “spectrum” of disorders 
ranging in severity of impairment, with high functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS) at the mild end.  
 
1.2.1.2 Asperger’s syndrome 
In the International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition (ICD-10) (World Health 
Organisation, 1992), AS is a distinct diagnostic category within the classification 
group of ‘pervasive childhood disorders’.  Diagnostic criteria for AS differ from those 
for classic autism in two key ways.  First, the individual’s intelligence quotient scores 
                                            
2 ‘Autistic psychopathy’ was later renamed Asperger’s syndrome because the 
American psychiatric community had a different understanding of the term 
‘psychopathy’ which they took to reflect criminal behaviour, rather than the 
symptoms described by Asperger (Wing, 1981).  
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must be at least average.  Secondly, the individual must have no delays in the 
acquisition of language or age appropriate skills, cognitive development, or adaptive 
behaviour (other than in the social domain).  People with AS are considered to show 
age appropriate curiosity about their environment.  However, like those with classic 
autism, they are said to be affected by social processing difficulties (e.g. lack of 
intuitive understanding of and empathy for others’ inner worlds) and therefore 
struggle in how they relate to others.  Despite this conceptual distinction, there 
appears to be considerable overlap between AS and HFA, with both groups 
appearing frequently in the literature as a composite (Bogadashina, 2005). 
 
Frith (1991, p. 20) states that if AS is to be considered a “subspecies of autism”, then 
the hypothesis that they share an underpinning cognitive deficit must be taken 
seriously.  If, however, the causal factors should prove to be different, this would 
need to be accommodated through a more complex model of autism and its variants.  
In the absence of any supporting evidence for the latter, she proposed that AS be 
conceptualised as a milder form of classic autism.  However, the difficulty in making 
a differential diagnosis remains, as she herself recognised, and is complicated by the 
fact that the behavioural signs considered to be ‘features’ of autism or AS may have 
other causes. 
 
Indeed, within DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) the conceptual 
distinction between classic autism and AS disappears, as the two are merged with 
‘pervasive developmental disorder’ and ‘childhood disintegrative disorder – non-
specified’ to form a singular ‘autism spectrum disorder’.  The new category also 
combines two elements of the triad of impairment (delayed language acquisition and 
difficulties in social interaction) to form a single criterion of deficits in “social 
communication and social interaction” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 
50).  Incontrovertible empirical support for the new grouped category remains elusive 
(Leckman & Pine, 2012), and many within the autism community fear that moving of 
the diagnostic bar may hinder their access to services and support.   
 
The questions of whether individuals with a diagnosis of classic autism or AS should 
be considered to have the same or distinctly different conditions (with some 
individuals being given both diagnoses) (Ozonoff, Rogers et al., 1991b; Rinehart, 
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Bradshaw et al., 2002), or whether the triad of impairment is as clearly defined as 
assumed (Bogadashina, 2005; Sacks, 1995) remain open for debate.  Extensive 
research has been conducted with children diagnosed with autism in attempt to 
better understand not only ‘how they do what they do’, but what that tells us about 
human cognitive function in general.  Adults with diagnoses of HFA or AS, however, 
have been the subject of far less inquiry. 
 
1.2.2 Psychological theories 
Until recently, the psychological literature regarding autism has been dominated by 
deficits models, such as the Executive Dysfunction Theory; Weak Central Coherence 
Theory and ‘Mindblindness’ and related theories.  A comprehensive review of the 
literature regarding these three main theoretical areas is beyond the scope of this 
report.  For this reason, I will outline the main hypotheses of the first two, while 
reserving a more thorough discussion for ‘Mindblindness’, which seeks to directly 
account for the specific cognitive characteristics reported in autism (i.e. impaired 
mentalizing capacity) that could result in a lack of awareness or care regarding one’s 
reputation. 
 
‘Executive Dysfunction Theory’ seeks to explain the repetitive behaviour, narrow 
range of interests and difficulty with transitions and change that are associated with 
autism in terms of impaired executive function (Ozonoff, Pennington et al., 1991a; 
Ozonoff, Strayer et al., 1994).  While each of these features could be expected to 
contribute to social difficulties in the broadest sense, they do not seem likely to 
impede awareness of others’ opinion regarding oneself. 
 
‘Weak Central Coherence (WCC) Theory’ (Happé, 1999) argues that people with 
ASPs have a cognitive style biased toward detail-oriented information processing 
rather than ‘broader picture’ processing.   WCC theory edges away from being a 
purely deficit-based account by highlighting intact and sometimes superior ‘islets of 
ability’ (including savant skills) often seen in individuals with ASPs, which might be 
supposed to be due to heightened attention to detail in a specific area.  However, 
such ‘islets’ might also result in obsessive behaviour and pedantic discourse and 
lead to some of the social difficulties experienced by many people with ASPs.  WCC 
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also aims to account for linguistic peculiarities often seen in individuals with ASPs.   
It might be argued that this theory has some explanatory power with regard to lack of 
concern for reputation, in that the person with autism might struggle to connect the 
elements of their behaviour with their effects on others to form a broader picture of 
others’ opinions.  The ‘Mindblindness’ theory of autism, however, directly addresses 
precisely this point. 
 
1.2.2.1 Mindblindness Theory 
A ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) deficit (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), or ‘mindblindness’  
(Baron-Cohen, 1995), has been proposed to explain the social and communication 
difficulties seen in individuals with ASPs.  ToM may be defined as an ability to know 
one’s own mental states and those of others, and the ability to make behavioural 
attributions in terms of these mental states.  This capacity would thus enable self-
awareness and, by providing a basis for empathy for others’ experience, could form 
a cornerstone for social judgement and interaction.  According to this theory, as a 
consequence of mindblindness, individuals with an ASP find other people’s 
behaviours bewildering, unpredictable and sometimes frightening.  Moreover, Frith 
(1991, p. 25) argues that much of the socially unacceptable behaviour displayed by 
individuals with autism, may become understandable if seen as a failure to calculate 
the effects of their behaviour upon other people.  Failure in this area would make 
reputation management difficult, if not impossible. 
 
1.2.2.1.1 Challenges to Mindblindness Theory 
A considerable challenge to the Mindblindness Theory is that it does not account for 
all of the core features said to comprise autism.  For example, it misses the narrow 
focus of interests and perseverative, stereotyped behaviours, difficulty switching 
attention and accepting change – features which might be better explained by the 
Executive Dysfunction Theory.  It also fails to explain the ‘islets of ability’ or savant 
skills which are better addressed by the Weak Central Coherence Theory.   
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Other challenges to the Mindblindness Theory may be seen from the fact that more 
able individuals with the diagnosis can pass first order ‘false belief’ tests3.  
Individuals with an AS diagnosis, can pass second order tests (Bowler, 1992; 
Ozonoff et al., 1991a; Ozonoff et al., 1991b).  Baron-Cohen and Jolliffe (1997) argue 
that the tools used are not complex tests of ToM, being designed to test 4 to 6 year 
olds’ skills in this domain.  As such they would not be suitable tests of fully 
functioning ToM in adults (including those with an ASP).  Using a test designed for 
adults (the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ task), they found that participants with 
HFA or AS performed significantly less well than controls.  However, they suggest 
that there may be more subtle deficits of ToM in individuals with autism than 
previously demonstrated, as opposed to a unitary impairment, which the theory 
predicts.   Re-opening the question, Steele and colleagues (2003) used a 
longitudinal study to demonstrate that ToM can develop over time in children with 
ASP, and suggest a link to their evolving language skills.  
 
It is important to note that the conceptualisation of ‘theory of mind’ is in itself 
problematic.  As pointed out by Rajendran and Mitchell (2007) there has been 
considerable debate as to what it is:  a folk theory (Wellman, Cross et al., 2001), a 
cognitive module (Baron-Cohen, 1995), or style of social problem solving (Peterson 
& Bowler, 2000) have all been proposed.   
 
Related to conceptual problems, challenges have also been made on ontological, 
epistemological and methodological grounds (Antaki, 2004; Costall & Leudar, 2004; 
Costall, Leudar et al., 2006; Leudar & Costall, 2004, 2009; Leudar, Costall et al., 
2004). For example, on ontological grounds, Leudar and Costell (2009, p. 3) object 
that despite the existence of theoretical alternatives such as “simulation theories”, 
ToM is now presented as “a relatively neutral, uncontroversial ‘construct’, or well 
established fact”, the assumptions of which are also presented as facts.  In 
particular, Leudar and Costall (2004) question the assumption of ‘indirectness’ (that 
in order for people to make sense of each other, they need to bridge a gulf between 
                                            
3 First order false belief tests are designed to assess the ability to correctly say what 
another person is thinking.  Second order tests involve saying what a second person 
thinks another is thinking. 
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what they can observe in others and what is ‘going on in the others’ minds’), and that 
of ‘detour’ (that this ‘gulf’ can only be bridged indirectly by inference or theorizing).  
 
Leudar and Costell (2009) also challenge ToMists on methodological grounds, 
pointing to a conviction that it is only on the basis of experimentation that we can 
determine whether or not people are able to understand each other.  This leads to 
contrived and unnatural test conditions having no ecological validity. These authors 
argue that people and their intentions need to be taken as relational and that 
observational studies could be a viable alternative to experiments. 
 
However valid such critiques may be, from a critical realist perspective one may 
accept that the ToM construct has generated useful questions and further ideas 
about how humans approach the problem of other minds.  As argued by Happé 
(1999), the Mindblindness Theory has been clinically useful in helping to understand 
and recognise some of the social and communication difficulties experienced by 
people with ASPs, as well as in helping to develop ways of addressing these 
difficulties.  
 
1.2.2.2 Summary of psychological theories 
A number of psychological theories have been proposed to account for the social 
and communication difficulties as well as the narrow focus of interest and repetitive 
behaviours, which as Happé and colleagues (2006, p. 1218) state, “mark out a highly 
recognizable and yet richly heterogeneous group of children and adults”.  However, 
no single theory has succeeded in providing a global or comprehensive account for 
all of these core diagnostic features.   Happé and colleagues (2006) also argue that 
it might be more useful to consider the symptoms of autism and their behavioural 
correlates independently.  The above review of evidence supports the utility of 
further fractioning of even the core features.  How far such fractioning may need to 
go remains to be determined.   
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1.3 Social cognition and the ‘problem of other minds’ 
A range of other social-cognitive processes may have roles to play in the social 
difficulties of people with ASPs, which have more recently become subject to 
investigation.  From among this range, the current report will focus on two key areas: 
social/moral evaluation and reputation management, through the lens of how people 
with and without an ASP approach such tasks.   
 
Social cognition has been defined as “the sum of those processes that allow 
individuals from the same species (conspecifics) to interact with one another.  Such 
interaction is a matter of survival, for individuals as well as for the species as a 
whole” (Frith & Frith, 2007, p. R724).  It may be seen as encompassing the 
generation, transmission, reception and interpretation of signals, such as speech, 
facial expressions, body language, gestures.  Such means may communicate 
information about the sender’s feelings, thinking or intentions, or about something in 
the environment he or she considers important.  Social cognition has been 
hypothesised to be functionally modular (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima et al., 1995), and 
mentalizing capabilities might be conceived as one element of an ‘interpretative 
component’ of social cognition.   
 
1.3.1 Reputation management 
As social beings, humans tend to be concerned with how their actions are seen and 
judged by others.  Reputation management is crucial in complex social interactions 
such as the building of trust (King-Casas, Tomlin et al., 2005). Deliberate reputation 
management would depend upon social cognition processes such as the awareness 
of the effects of our own social signals upon others.  Accurate interpretation of 
signals received in return depends upon the ability to adopt another person’s point of 
view.  Frith and Frith (2008b) suggest that successful reputation management 
requires a higher level of mentalization in which we represent not only the other 
person’s mental state, but also their representation of our own.   
 
In line with Frith and Frith (2008a), King-Casas and colleagues (King-Casas et al., 
2005) suggest that such capacities mostly involve implicit, automatic processing, 
beyond normal awareness.  However, these automatic processes can, in some 
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cases, be explicitly and consciously over-ridden when need be.  For instance, 
humans tend to proactively manage their reputations, especially when they know 
that they are being observed by others (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).  
 
1.3.1.1 Reputation management in HFA/AS and comparison groups 
Neuroscience research by Chiu, Kayali, Kishida and colleagues (2008) may support 
this implicit/explicit information processing distinction (Frith & Frith, 2008a; King-
Casas et al., 2005), as well as the notion that a lack of implicit, or intuitive, skills may 
be compensated through the use of explicit, conscious processes.  (Chiu et al., 
2008) measured cerebral activity of male volunteers with HFA engaging in reciprocal 
generosity tasks.  An “Investor” chooses a sum of money to give to a “Trustee”.  The 
chosen amount is tripled, and the Trustee decides how much of the total to return to 
the Investor.  Chiu et al. (2008) found that while participants’ behaviour matched that 
of TDI participants in earlier research, their cerebral activity did not.  Unlike TDIs 
(who show increased activity in one area of the brain during the investment phase of 
the task and increases in other areas when they learn what sum has been repaid), 
participants with HFA did not show the characteristic increases during the investment 
phase.  Typical cerebral activity resumes in HFA participants during the ‘other’ 
phase, when the amount of the Trustee’s repayment is revealed. The authors 
interpret these results as suggesting that people with HFA or AS may lack the ability 
to calculate how their actions may influence others’ perception of them, yet remain 
able to evaluate the effects of others’ behaviour upon them.  These results also 
provide evidence that the mechanisms of social interaction may be more 
‘modularised’ than previously thought, and, crucially, that more ‘sub-modules’ may 
be intact in persons with HFA than has been previously assumed. 
 
Commenting on this study, Frith and Frith (2008a) speculate that the restriction of 
this anomaly to the investment or ‘self’ phase of the task (so called because it 
involves awareness of the self acting in a social context), might be due to 
participants with HFA focusing on making the investment, while remaining unaware 
that they are also gaining or losing reputation in their partner’s eyes.  In the trust 
game, one is not only picking an amount of money to invest.  Investors are also 
predicting how their investments will affect their partner’s behaviour.  In the ‘other’ 
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phase of the game, however, the Investor evaluates their partner’s response, but this 
evaluation comes a posteriori and so no longer involves trying to build a reputation in 
the partner’s eyes.  Thus the ‘self’ phase could be conceived as involving adopting a 
future-oriented multi-layered ToM stance:  you need to predict what the other person 
will think of you if you do X, and moreover, you want to win their trust.  In the 
repayment phase, the social meta-cognitive task is to gauge your partner’s view of 
you as the means to knowing the value of your own actions.  Is the added ‘predictive’ 
element the proverbial ‘straw’ for participants with ASD? 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, both implicit and explicit ToM-like abilities would 
be a considerable advantage, as building and maintaining one’s reputation would be 
crucial in terms of inclusion and status within the group, and thus vital to survival and 
reproduction.  ToM difficulties in persons with HFA and AS could mean that “such 
higher-order representations in fast on-line interaction are probably too difficult” (Frith 
& Frith, 2008b, p. 332). 
 
1.3.1.2 The Observer Effect 
As noted above, humans tend to pay close attention to the consequences of their 
behaviour upon their reputation.  It has been found that charitable behaviour can be 
elicited by the presence of observers, and that this effect is enhanced when the 
observer looks directly at the donor (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981).  Findings by 
Bourrat, Baumard, and McKay (2011) suggest that mere surveillance cues (such as 
images of human eyes on a questionnaire) suffice to increase pro-social behaviour in 
TDIs.  This effect has also been demonstrated in studies using stylised “eye spots” 
on computer screens (Haley & Fessler, 2005) or using a pair of eyes on a notice 
(Bateson, Nettle et al., 2006; Ernest-Jones, Nettle et al., 2011), a robot with human 
eyes on a computer screen (Burnham & Hare, 2007), or even cues as subtle as a 
three dot schematic representation of a face (Rigdon, Ishii et al., 2009).  
 
1.3.1.2.1 The Observer Effect in HFA/AS and Comparison Groups 
To the knowledge of this researcher, only one study to date (Izuma et al., (2011) has 
examined the effect of observation upon pro-social behaviours in individuals with a 
diagnosis of autism, but produced mixed results.  In one part of their study they 
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found that an observer sitting behind the participant (with a cover story to explain 
their presence) did not influence reaction times or numbers of charitable donations 
made by participants with HFA.  This contrasted to results from the control group, 
which showed an influence of the observer effect upon both measures.  In their 
experimental design, the observer was not directly involved in the charitable 
transaction (itself carried out on a computer).  This aimed to test the influence of a 
“more distant observer or … the eyes of people more generally” (Izuma et al., 2011, 
p. 17306), in contrast to previous studies involving trust games using live partners 
(where the behaviour of participants with ASD did not differ significantly to that of 
controls).  These authors conclude from their findings that participants with ASD are 
impaired in their ability to take into account the impression they make on others.  
They do, however, acknowledge that this may be circumstantial.  It may be, for 
instance, that in direct interaction, persons with HFA or AS are able to hold a 
conscious, meta-cognitive awareness of the other’s view of them, while under other 
circumstances (e.g. when the observer has no stake or direct involvement in the 
situation) they are not.  It may also be that in the latter circumstance, they are aware 
but consider the other’s view irrelevant and thus do not attend to it.  Either 
interpretation could be consistent with Chiu and colleagues (2008) and Frith and 
Frith (2008b) discussed above, in suggesting that reputation management (as has 
been previously suggested with ToM) may possibly be modular, consisting of implicit 
and explicit routes. 
 
1.3.1.3 Summary of reputation management and the observer effect 
In order to be effective, reputation management seems likely to require a capacity to 
calculate the effects of one’s behaviour upon others and to form mental 
representations of the opinions they form in response.  Previous research in this 
area suggests that pro-social behaviours in TDI individuals increase in the presence 
of surveillance cues, which are presumed to trigger ‘reputation management’ 
behaviours.  This is also appears to be the case with persons with ASPs under some 
circumstances, especially those requiring direct interaction with other people.  
Commenting on findings by Chiu and colleagues (2008), Frith and Frith (2008b) 
highlight that similar results are not seen in trust games played against computers 
(where there is no actual reputation to be won or lost): this pattern is only seen in 
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games involving pairs of humans.  Such differences raise the question of whether 
different hypothesised elements of reputation management pose varying degrees of 
difficulty to people with ASPs.   
 
1.3.2 Moral Judgement 
The demonstration of moral values may be another way to engage in trust and 
reputation building processes.  In essence, publically taking a moral stance says, 
“Trust me.  I believe in certain things and you can count on me to act accordingly.”  
One’s reputation could be put on the line by not doing so. Rates of second and third 
party moralistic punishment of trust violations have been reported to increase when 
observed or made public (Kurzban, DeScioli et al., 2007; Piazza & Bering, 2008).   
 
Moral sense and reasoning are important for the individual in his or her wider social 
context, as well as for society itself.  The survival of social groups depends on the 
establishment of complex, often unstated heuristics that guide us in social 
interactions by dictating which behaviours are permissible and which will be deemed 
offensive or dangerous to social cohesion.  The most basic of these rules appear to 
be those regarding ‘moral transgressions’ (those impinging upon the welfare or rights 
of individuals or groups) which are not deemed to be acceptable except perhaps in 
cases of proportional self-defence.  Numerous studies suggest that these are shared 
across cultures (Hollos, Leis et al., 1986; Snarey, Reimer et al., 1985; Song, 
Smetana et al., 1987).  
 
Learning to take the perspective of a victim of a moral transgression has been 
proposed to be a key task in the development of moral judgement (Kohlberg, 1981). 
As such, moral judgement is another area of social cognition that would be likely to 
involve mentalizing processes (Smetana, Jambon et al., 2012; Young, Cushman et 
al., 2007).  
 
The rules guiding social judgement may vary greatly with circumstances.   In contrast 
to moral transgressions, which are deemed to result in harm to self or others, 
violations of social conventions have no tangible victim.  How do we evaluate 
behaviour such as jay walking across an empty road or etiquette breaches?  In such 
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‘grey areas’ different individuals may read the circumstances and behaviours 
differently, and evaluation will involve personal value judgements.  Research has 
shown that while most individuals judge that transgressions in general are not 
permitted, violations of convention tend to be judged as less serious and more 
‘permissible’ than moral violations (Smetana & Braeges, 1990).  Indeed, moral 
transgressions are generally considered forbidden even in the absence of explicit 
rules, while conventional transgressions are seen as permissible unless there is 
explicit interdiction (Smetana, 1985).  Moral transgressions are also perceived to be 
less authority contingent, whereas permission from an authority figure may make a 
breach of convention more acceptable (Turiel, 1983).  
 
1.3.2.1 Acquisition of the Moral-Conventional Distinction 
The ability to distinguish between moral and ‘conventional’ violations is seen in 
typically developed children as young as three years of age (Smetana & Braeges, 
1990).  Competing theoretical camps have grown around the question of how we 
develop the ability to make such a distinction:  developmental (e.g. Piaget, 1932; 
Kohlberg, 1977), ‘constructivist’ (e.g. Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 1985) and 
‘sentimentalist’ (e.g. Nichols, 2002). 
 
1.3.2.1.1 Developmental theories  
Piaget (1932) made the early distinction between two types of moral evaluation.  
‘Moral realism’, he suggested, dominates up to the age of about 10 years and 
involves evaluating another’s actions in terms of the extent to which these conform to 
established rules and in terms of consequences for others and the actor (Is the 
victim harmed?  Is the action punished?).  Within this evaluation style, rules are 
deemed ‘sacred’ and ‘unalterable’ and the actor’s intention is generally ignored.  In 
contrast, ‘autonomous morality’ begins to be seen around 8 years of age and 
gradually becomes the dominant evaluation style.  It involves the recognition that 
rules are established and maintained through social negotiation and agreement.  
Evaluations based upon ‘autonomous morality’ may be modified to fit prevailing 
social opinion.  They also prioritise the intention of the actor over the material 
consequences of the behaviour.  For Piaget these evaluation styles arise from two 
different socialisation experiences:  ‘moral realism’ stems from rules that are 
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imposed by omnipotent adults, while ‘autonomous morality’ results from experiences 
with peers. 
 
Based upon case analysis of boys ranging in age from 10 to 16 years, Kohlberg and 
colleagues (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Rest, Turiel et al., 1969; Snarey et al., 1985) 
suggested that ‘justice reasoning’ develops in six qualitatively different stages that 
serve equivalent functions at successive points of development.  These stages 
represent underlying thought organisation rather than specific responses determined 
by knowledge or familiarity with the situation, or situations like it.  In contrast to 
Piaget, Kohlberg proposes that the stages are not a product of socialisation, but 
instead are constructed by the child in the process of thinking about and acting upon 
the world. 
 
One difficulty with the above propositions is that they fail to account for the early 
development of the moral/conventional distinction observed in very young children. 
 
1.3.2.1.2 Constructivist Theories  
Similar to initial developmental theories advanced by Kohlberg, constructivist 
theorists (Rest et al., 1969; Smetana, 1985) propose that there are different 
conceptual frameworks underlying moral and conventional domains.  These are 
proposed to be constructed by (rather than being imposed upon) the child, through 
experience of qualitatively different types of events and interaction, and found that 
this occurs at a much earlier age than previously hypothesised (Smetana & Braeges, 
1990; Turiel, 1983).  
 
Turiel (1977) posits that individuals have a variety of means available to them for 
purposes of constructing their wider moral code including observation, 
communication, imitation, role-taking, the ability to consider personal past 
experience and counter-factual reasoning.   
 
Blair (1992) argues various shortcomings in previous theories, Turiel’s in particular. 
For instance, in applying personal past experience of being a victim it is 
understandable that a child would develop a rule against allowing him or herself to 
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be victimised, but why would this result in a general proscription against committing 
harm to others?  Nor does Turiel explain why moral violations come to be judged 
more severely than conventional transgressions or considered less contingent upon 
circumstances or other moderating factors.  To address the second of these points, 
Blair suggests that transgressions which produce victims produce an affective 
response, while ‘convention’ transgressions do not.  Severity of transgressions would 
therefore be judged by the strength of the emotions triggered, which would serve as 
a guide as to whether circumstances or other factors might carry weight. 
 
Drawing on the observations by ethologists that some animal species suppress 
aggressive behaviour in response to submission cues from con-specifics, Blair 
(1992) has proposed that humans may possess a functional analogue to this which 
may work alongside executive functions.  He proposes an affect-triggered, cognitive 
‘violence inhibition mechanism’ (VIM), which would cause distress cues to be 
experienced as aversive, as a prerequisite to the development of three elements of 
morality: moral emotions (e.g. sympathy, empathy4, guilt, remorse); the inhibition of 
aggressive behaviour; the ‘moral/conventional’ distinction.  According to this model, 
neither ToM nor empathy are required precursors to moral emotions per se.  
However, he argues that ToM does come into play when constructing internally 
generated moral justifications (such as when tending to reputation management).    
 
1.3.2.1.3 ‘Sentimental Theory’ – adding a ‘disgust’ domain 
Nichols (2002) challenges Blair’s account by pointing out that there may be a 
number of events, such as natural disasters or tooth aches which might be classed 
as ‘bad’ on the basis of producing an aversive emotional response, but which could 
hardly be considered ‘immoral’.  As an alternative to Blair’s (1992) VIM model, 
Nichols (2002) suggests that the ability to make the ‘moral/conventional’ distinction 
depends on having ‘normative theories’ concerning which actions are prohibited and 
why, and affective responses which confer greater or lesser degrees of  importance 
upon the norms.  Thus while both ‘moral’ and ‘convention’ transgressions depend on 
                                            
4 Empathising has been said to involve ‘role taking’, which in turn depends upon 
‘mentalizing’ [itself involving the ability to make a representation of the mental states 
of others – or ToM-like capabilities (Leslie, 1987)]. 
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knowledge of rules (‘normative theories’), only the ‘moral’ (harmful) transgressions 
would be expected to elicit emotional responses as well.  To test his ‘sentimental’ 
theory, he asked 19 philosophy students to evaluate ‘moral’, ‘convention’ and 
‘disgust’ (affect-triggering but not associated with distress cues) behaviours (such as 
drinking spit at a dinner party) on a number dimensions (permissability, seriousness, 
justification, authority contingency).  His findings support the hypothesis that ‘disgust’ 
transgressions differ from ‘convention’ transgressions along the same normative and 
affective dimensions as ‘moral’ transgressions.  Difference between the ‘moral’ and 
‘disgust’ domains was seen in the justifications selected from a multiple choice set of 
options. 
 
One weakness in Nichols (2002, p. 234) ‘sentimental theory’ is that it does not 
explain how “these different mechanisms conspire to enable” the distinction between 
‘moral’ and ‘disgust’ transgressions.  One possibility might be that affect related to 
‘disgust’ evolved as an adaptive emotional response to hygiene threats to health, in 
contrast to affect related to distress signals from others.   This question would merit 
further exploration. 
 
1.3.2.2 The Moral/Convention/Disgust Distinction in Persons with HFA or AS 
Frith (1991) notes that many individuals with AS show excessive concern with “doing 
the right thing” (p. 25).  In support of his VIM model, Blair (1996) presents evidence 
that children with HFA are able to successfully distinguish between ‘moral’ versus 
‘conventional’ transgressions, regardless of their ToM ability.  Other studies of moral 
judgment in children with HFA have produced similar results (Leslie, Mallon et al., 
2006b).   
 
As Blair predicted, such results are surprising if empathy or perspective-taking are 
indeed the basis for moral responses.  Like Nichols (2002), Leslie and colleagues 
(2006b) suggest that moral judgements are not simply the reflexive result of 
recognising distress in others, but are likely to also involve both implicit and explicit 
moral reasoning.  They further suggest that basic moral judgement and ToM may 
develop independently to some extent, but also interact.  In experiments where the 
task is to judge transgressions such as lying, an understanding of intention is 
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important in forming a judgement (Siegal & Peterson, 1998), implying that cognitive 
processes may start with ToM and move to moral judgement.  The contrary has also 
been found, with processes running from moral judgement to ToM (Leslie, Knobe et 
al., 2006a). 
 
Such a distinction is also supported by neuroimaging studies of TDI adults making 
moral judgements suggest that several cortical areas are shared by moral judgement 
and ToM-type processes (Greene & Haidt, 2002).  Castelli, Frith et al. (2002) found 
that the same areas show little or no activity when participants with ASP engaged in 
ToM tasks.  
 
Using the same protocol, Zalla and colleagues (2011) built upon the Nichols (2002) 
study with the addition of an comparison participant group composed of individuals 
with HFA or AS. Their findings suggest that adults with HFA or AS also make the 
‘moral/conventional’ distinction in terms of whether the action is allowed, its degree 
of seriousness and its authority dependence.  However, their participants failed to 
differentiate between moral and disgust transgressions regarding gravity and did not 
give welfare-based justifications for their moral judgments.  They also judged 
conventional and disgust transgressions more harshly than did members of the 
comparison group.  Statistical analysis showed a relationship between the 
seriousness rating and ToM impairment.   
 
In a mixed methods study, Bartlett (2010) explored how individuals with and without 
diagnoses of HFA or AS weigh intention against outcome in moral evaluation tasks.   
Her statistical analysis indicates that the two groups’ evaluations of the scenarios 
under different intentionality and outcome conditions were similar and that 
‘intentionality’ had the biggest impact on judgment ratings, regardless of the 
protagonist’s honesty.  A semi-structured interview was used to explore participants’ 
reasoning when rating the protagonists and their actions.   Bartlett identified 
similarities and differences between the groups with regard to knowledge applied by 
participants when forming their judgments.  Both groups drew on knowledge of 
situational context and social relational rules in their reasoning.  However, while 
control participants were more likely to draw on social knowledge when evaluating 
negative intention scenarios, comments from ASP participants reflected increased 
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personal identification with the protagonist and decreased reliance upon social rules 
in judging these scenarios.   
 
As with reputation management/trust-building tasks, moral judgements by TDIs also 
appear to be moderated by surveillance cues.  In an experiment by (Bourrat et al., 
2011) two moral transgression vignettes were used to elicit 1 – 9 ratings of moral 
acceptability with images of either eyes or flowers printed on the papers between the 
stories and the associated Likert scales.  Participants were randomly allocated to 
one of the two conditions (eyes = 43; flowers = 48).  Harsher judgements correlated 
with the presence of eyes images than with the presence of flower images.  Whether 
this would also be the case with people with HFA or AS has yet to be investigated. 
 
1.4 Clinical and research implications 
In sum, the literature suggests that opportunities for reputation enhancement can 
contribute to sustaining prosocial behaviour.  Public declarations of moral judgments 
can provide just such opportunities.  As discussed above, even subtle surveillance 
cues during moral judgement tasks have been found to increase moral 
condemnation in TDIs (Bourrat et al., 2011). However this has not been tested in 
participants with HFA or AS.   
 
Adults with ASPs are generally assumed to be oblivious or indifferent to the 
impression they make on others (Chevalier, Molesworth et al., 2012; Izuma et al., 
2011; Kanner, 1943).  ToM theories predict that such an indifference would be due to 
an inability to see from the other’s perspective and therefore to see the need, much 
less notice opportunities, for reputation enhancement.  The research discussed 
above, however, suggests that people with ASPs may not be indifferent to reputation 
management, but may struggle to manage all of the tasks involved under certain 
circumstances such as when a predictive component is added (Frith & Frith, 2008b).  
Although both public moral judgement and generosity both provide opportunities for 
reputation enhancement, as well as the building of trust, they are not, in and of 
themselves, equivalent.  As other aspects of social cognition would appear to be 
modular, this may be discovered to be the case with reputation management as well.   
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The current study has implications both clinically and scientifically: 
 
1. Increasing evidence suggests that social cognition may not be a unitary 
phenomenon, but rather that there may be dedicated mechanisms for an 
array of faculties.  Our current understanding is that people with ASD or 
Asperger’s syndrome have social difficulties.  The exact nature and cause of 
these difficulties, however, have yet to be identified with certainty.  There is 
thus scope for refining our models of these social difficulties and the theories 
explaining them.  Developing a more accurate theoretical picture of ASPs may 
also enable us to develop increasingly finely tuned screening tools, and 
eventually better interventions to improve function in the social domain. 
 
2. From a practical perspective, within the current frameworks for educating 
individuals with autistic presentations, we may be neglecting socially 
important abilities, which may be intact and could therefore be reinforced.  By 
helping to map these areas, this research may aid in the development of 
better interventions to enhance their interactions with the wider social world. 
 
3. Many people with HFA or AS suffer from social anxiety (Kuusikko, Pollock-
Wurman et al., 2008) as well as poor social understanding and skills. Better 
understanding of reputation management abilities in this group may also lead 
to the development of psychological interventions to help in this area, as well. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
The question therefore does not concern whether or not social evaluation and 
reputation management remain as intact, unitary functions in persons with HFA or 
AS, but how do individuals with and without ASPs approach social evaluation and 
reputation management tasks?  
 
Adopting a critical realist position that individuals are able to put thoughts and beliefs 
to words which mirror their individual truth, the primary research question to be 
addressed in this study is: 
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How do members of each group talk about their social evaluation decisions and 
issues of reputation? 
 
Areas of further interest for this study are social evaluation behaviour, the ‘observer 
effect’ and the question of what types of information might serve as inputs to activate 
which components of reputation management.  A modular view of reputation 
management invites thinking about abilities as well as deficits.  Before attempting to 
answer such questions, however, it would be useful to pilot a research tool 
developed for this purpose.  Therefore, a second question to be explored within this 
study concerns:   
 
Does a survey questionnaire adapted from previous research provide an 
appropriate tool to assess social evaluation behaviours and the ‘observer effect’? 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Epistemology 
As stated previously, a critical realist (e.g. Lopez and Potter, 2005) stance was 
adopted for this research.   
 
2.2. Recruitment 
Following ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the School of the 
School of Psychology, University of East London (UEL) (Appendix 2), three 
participants with HFA or AS were recruited from among a group taking part in on-
going research at UEL.  Another five participants were recruited via personal 
contacts of the researcher, and by sending invitations to national and local 
organisations.  All organisations were informed that they could contact the 
researcher at any point with questions, concerns, and that the researcher could 
attend any group meetings, if this was deemed helpful and appropriate. 
 
Those who expressed interest were sent the information sheet (Appendix 3) and 
asked to contact the researcher if they wished to take part.  Volunteers were given 
the option of meeting the researcher at the Stratford Campus of the University of 
East London (UEL), or other location convenient to them, or to take part remotely via 
the internet and Skype or telephone.  All participants who opted for face-to-face 
participation choose to come to UEL. 
 
Control group participants were recruited from a convenience sample of UEL 
students, as well as friends and colleagues of the researcher.  Control participants 
were matched for age and sex to the experimental group. 
 
2.2.1 Participant Demographics 
Eight participants were recruited for each group, resulting in a sample of 16 
individuals.  Demographic information was gathered (Appendix 4), regarding age, 
sex, nationality, cultural background and primary language.  Table 2.1 shows that the 
groups were matched for sex, age, nationality, primary language, faith group and 
years of formal education.  
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Table 2.1: Demographics:  Control5 and ASP group members. 
        
    Control Group ASP Group  
Sex Male 7 7 
  Female 1 1 
Diagnosis HFA n/a 1 
 AS n/a 8 
Age at diagnosis (Mean) n/a 27.3 
Age at testing (Mean) 39.0 37.6 
Nationality British 8 8 
Primary language English 8 8 
Religion or faith group Atheist 2 3 
 Christian 1 3 
 Hindu 1 0 
 None 4 2 
Years of formal 
education (Mean) 18 15.9 
        
2.2.1.1 ASP group participants  
Participants in the ASP group ranged in age from 20 to 71 years.  The male to 
female ratio in the ASP group would be expected to be 2.25:1 on the basis of 
diagnosis rates (Rinehart et al., 2002).  Therefore the current group was not 
representative in this regard.  Participants in this group had been formally diagnosed 
by multi-disciplinary clinics, between the ages of 4 and 67 years.  This range is not 
typical of the average age range of diagnosis, which has been reported to be 5 to 11 
years of age (Howlin & Asgharian, 1999).   All participants had been given a 
diagnosis of AS, although one participant had an additional diagnosis of HFA.  
 
2.2.1.2 Control group participants 
The control group comprised eight typically developed and intact individuals, ranging 
in age from 23 to 69 years.  The male-to-female ratio matched that of the ASP group 
at 7:1, not typical of the general population.   
                                            
5 The term ‘control’, rather than TDI, will be used throughout in reference to participants without a 
diagnosis of an ASD, as the latter term implies assumptions of normality and anticipated categorical 
differences between the groups which are not supported by the current evidence base (Saxe, 2006).  
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2.2.1.3 The Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al., 2001) 
Both groups were screened for autistic spectrum traits using the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ), as the presence of such traits in comparison participants would be a 
confounding variable [see Baron-Cohen, et al. (2001) for reliability and validity].   An 
AQ score of 32+ is considered by the authors to be the cut-off point in discriminating 
between groups, as this point would result in as few false positives as possible.  One 
ASP participant scored below this point, although their score of 22 is considered by 
the authors to be an intermediate level score (score range 20 – 31).  One 
comparison group participant also scored within this intermediate level (AQ score = 
21).  
 
The mean AQ score for the TDI group, which was 10.25, contrasted to the mean 
score for the ASP group score of 36.25.  Because of the small sample size, the 
means were compared using a Mann-Whitney U Test of difference (non-parametric 
equivalent to the T-test).  A significant difference between the groups was found (U = 
.000; Z = -3.366; Exact Sig. (two-tailed) = .000).  This is consistent with previous 
research (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
In order for participants to consider whether participation in this study would be 
appropriate for them, they were sent the information sheet at the earliest stages of 
contact.  The primary inclusion criteria were set out in the recruitment material and 
information sheet: 
• A diagnosis of High Functioning Autism or Asperger’s syndrome (or no 
diagnosis for controls); 
• Adults, aged 18 years and older. 
 
As the experimental and distractor tasks would require reading (instructions and the 
vignettes) and the ability to communicate answers in written form, other inclusion 
criteria included: 
• Good English language comprehension and expression; 
• No diagnosis of a learning difficulty or WRAT-3 score in the range of 
‘borderline to impaired’ (scaled score of 5 or below). 
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Conformity to these criteria was assessed by the demographics questionnaire at the 
beginning of the testing session.  The Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT-3) 
(Wilkinson, 1993) was used as a screening tool for level of intellectual and verbal 
functioning.  If results from the WRAT-3 or demographics indicated that the 
participant would not meet the inclusion criteria, it was planned that testing would be 
stopped and the reasons for this explained to the participant in a debriefing session.  
No participant was excluded from the study. 
 
2.3 Design 
A qualitative design was used, with a semi-structured interview supplemented by a 
Retrospective Verbal Protocol (RVP), which generated further qualitative data 
concerning participants’ performance of social evaluation tasks and reputation 
management.  Use of the social evaluation survey (described below, p. 35) was also 
piloted as a potential tool to gather quantitative data in future research. 
 
2.3.1 Quantitative Elements 
2.3.1.1 Cognitive battery 
A broad range of cognitive functions is believed to underpin social cognition. In order 
to ascertain that all participants had intact cognitive functioning in the relevant 
domains, a selection of neuropsychological tests was used so that the data collected 
could be considered reliable and valid. Test items selected were of established 
reliability and validity (Strauss, Sherman et al., 2006) and considered to be most 
relevant in relation to the experimental task of ‘action evaluation’.   
 
2.3.1.1.1 Verbal function 
The reading sub-test from the WRAT-3 (Wilkinson, 1993) has been shown to 
correlate well with intellectual functioning (Strauss et al., 2006) and was used to 
establish a baseline estimate of the level of overall intellection functioning of each 
participant.  This test consists of a list of 42 increasingly difficult words, which 
participants are required to read aloud. 
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2.3.1.1.2 Short-term and working memories 
Participants’ attention and working memory were assessed using the working 
memory sub-test of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 
1997).  To test short-term memory stores, participants were asked to remember and 
repeat back increasingly long strings of numbers, which had been dictated to them.  
Working memory was tested by having participants repeat number sequences in 
reverse order. 
 
2.3.1.1.3 Executive function 
The Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning System (DKEFS) (Delis, Kaplan et al., 
2001) verbal fluency subtest was used to assess both verbal fluency and executive 
functioning through increasing the cognitive effort needed for the tasks.  Tasks 
required participants to monitor their selection and articulation by listing as many 
words as possible beginning with the letters F, A and S, within one minute for each.  
They were then given one minute to name a maximum of animals and another 
minute to say as many boys’ names as possible. The categories task is more 
demanding, requiring participants to switch between categories (fruits and furniture) 
for another minute, soliciting both monitoring and inhibition capabilities.  DKEFS 
tests have also been shown to be of good reliability and validity (Strauss et al., 
2006). 
 
2.3.1.2 Action evaluation survey 
A pilot on-line survey (Appendix 5) was created to present tasks drawn from previous 
research (Nichols, 2002; Zalla et al., 2011) investigating ‘moral judgment’ - 
conceptualised here as one aspect of reputation management – and whether 
participants distinguish between ‘moral’, ‘conventional’, and ‘disgust’ transgressions.  
Vignettes from previous research tended to be oriented toward children and were 
adapted for this study to use with adults.  Anachronistic vignettes were updated, and 
a novel element (a drawing of human eyes) was included in the header of half of the 
vignettes presented to each participant. 
 
A preliminary version of the on-line survey was tested for clarity, ease of use and 
face validity with five colleagues and relations of the researcher.  A fourth domain 
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was added, combining moral and conventional transgressions (referred to as 
‘ambiguous’ below), due to concerns that vignettes from the three original domains 
were likely to be universally condemned, and result in data with little to no variation.   
 
Six versions of the action evaluation survey were used to collect data regarding the 
experimental conditions.  The survey comprised eight vignettes describing 
hypothetical violations of common ‘moral’, ‘conventional’, ‘disgust’ and ‘ambiguous’ 
rules.  Other than the setting of the vignette and names of the characters involved, 
no contextual information was provided, with the aim of focussing participants’ 
attention upon the act itself with no moderating factors.  
 
Examples:   
(‘moral’ domain) 
Rob and John are exercising at the gym.  Suddenly, John punches Rob 
in the face. 
 
(conventional domain) 
Mary is at a dinner party. She picks up her bowl of soup 
and drinks it. 
 
(disgust domain) 
Mark found some rotting meat in the refrigerator and ate it raw. 
 
(ambiguous domain) 
Al went to a picnic with his family.  He told his aunt that her hat 
made her look ugly.  
 
Each version of the survey contained the same eight items, the order of which was 
varied according to a balanced Latin square. Half of the versions had the ‘eyes’ 
condition in the first part of the task and ‘no eyes’ in the second part, the other half 
had the “no eyes” condition first. 
 
The aim was to replicate previous research investigating whether individuals having 
diagnoses of HFA or AS are able to access the rules enabling the moral-
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conventional-disgust distinction (Zalla et al., 2011), and to explore responses from  
participants from both groups in ‘eyes’/‘no eyes’ conditions. 
 
Participants were asked to read each vignette carefully and to judge each action in 
terms of: 
• Whether it was alright or not;  
• The degree of acceptability;  
• Why they felt it was alright or not;  
• Whether it might be alright if explicitly permitted by an authority figure; 
• Whether a lack of witnesses would make it alright;  
• How they made their judgements.   
 
An additional question reflecting the observer effect was included.  Questions 
assessing participants’ opinions were presented in the same order for each vignette.   
 
Qualitative data from the open questions was expanded upon during the semi-
structured interview (Appendix 6), using an RVP. 
 
2.3.1.2.1 Avoiding possible confounds 
The existence and duration of a possible priming effect ensuing from the presence of 
the eyes image is unknown.  Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) 50 item AQ was 
included between the ‘eyes’ and ‘no eyes’ sections of the survey to serve as a 
distractor task between conditions.  The aim was to address this potential 
confounding effect when the ‘eyes’ vignettes were presented first.  The AQ was also 
included to screen for autistic spectrum traits among control participants.   
 
Example: 
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’  
intentions. 
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2.3.1.3 Use of new technology 
To avoid the presence of the researcher during the action evaluation tasks (another 
potential confounding variable), on-line survey technology was used in order for the 
survey tasks to be self-administered by participants.  To broaden the recruitment 
pool to potential participants unavailable during standard working hours or located 
outside of the UK, entirely remote access participation was offered, using Skype or 
over the telephone. 
 
2.3.2 Use of Qualitative Methods 
Previous unpublished doctoral studies (Bartlett, 2010; Caffrey, 2006) in related areas 
have incorporated a qualitative element with an aim to generate another level of 
information about how individuals with ASPs manage the rules involved in social 
interaction.  However, use of this methodology remains rare, leaving a gap in the 
published literature.  In the current study, qualitative data was sought regarding the 
reasons why the behaviours in the vignettes were, or were not, felt to be acceptable; 
how participants found doing the task and how they reached their ‘acceptability’ 
ratings.   The aim was to explore whether all participants draw on comparable social 
knowledge to make these distinctions. 
 
Two open answer questions were embedded within the survey itself.  For example:  
Please say a little about why you think was it okay, or not, for John 
to punch Rob? 
 
Further qualitative data was collected using a semi-structured interview upon 
completion of the survey, as per related studies (Bartlett, 2010; Caffrey, 2006; 
Husbands, 2008).  The interview also incorporated an RVP, allowing the opportunity 
to review and expand participants’ action evaluation survey responses with them.  
 
Verbal protocols (‘concurrent’ and ‘retrospective’) have been used since at least the 
latter half of the 20th Century within market research and psychology as a means of 
studying consumer behaviour and other forms of decision making.  The objective of 
RVP is to trace thought processes involved in decision making, such as the kinds of 
knowledge and considerations participants draw upon during social evaluation.  RVP 
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asks participants to recount their decision-making processes after the fact (ideally 
immediately after) rather than describing the process while engaged in it 
[‘Concurrent Verbal Protocol’ (CVP)].  There are pros and cons to both CVP and 
RVP.  For example, CVP is associated with more insights into the decision making 
process.  However, it may direct cognitive resources away from the task, thus 
slowing performance (Kuusela & Pallab, 2000).  RVP may be less of a distraction 
during performance, and has been found to generate more information regarding the 
final choice, but it has also been associated with forgetting, fabrication, and 
justification rather than explanation (Kuusela & Pallab, 2000; Russo, Johnson et al., 
1989). Although the RVP is may perhaps be seen as less reliable than the CVP 
method, CVP was rejected because the presence of the researcher or a recording 
devise would be expected to compete with the potential effects of the eye images in 
the survey logos.  Responses collected via either method may also be subject to 
social desirability considerations.  However, while far from perfect, it seemed 
reasonable that use of the survey questionnaire as a probe might provide 
opportunities for a deeper exploration of participants’ social reasoning.   
 
2.4 Procedure 
Data collection took place either in person in research cubicles at the UEL 
Department of Psychology, or remotely via internet and telephone or Skype. 
 
Another copy of the information sheet was given.  Confidentiality and data protection 
was reviewed.  All participants were reminded of their right to withdraw from the 
study without consequence at any time.  Participants were invited to ask questions 
about the project and, if they were willing to proceed, written consent was obtained 
(Appendix 7).  Consent to use previous demographic and cognitive data for 
participants who had taken part in earlier UEL Autistic Spectrum Disorders Research 
Group studies was also sought and obtained.  
 
The structure of the session was explained, and further information was given about 
the debriefing interview and audio-recording.  Participants were given further 
opportunity to ask questions.  For new participants, demographic data, such as 
gender, age, education history, cultural background and primary language, was 
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gathered and the four cognitive tests were administered to ensure that both groups 
were matched for cognitive ability.  A break was offered before continuing on to the 
experimental tasks. 
 
All participants were then given the action evaluation tasks, which were self-
administered via computer (using the Survey Gizmo® platform).  Standardised 
instructions outlining this part of the session were provided.  Participants were asked 
if they understood the instructions and if they had questions.  The front page 
(demographics items) was loaded onto the computer and the researcher left the 
room.   
 
Written instructions and the vignette were included in a ‘header’ at the top of each 
page.  It was emphasised that there were no right or wrong answers and that it was 
the participant’s opinions that were of interest.  Each scenario was followed by six 
equivalent questions, as described above.  In order to keep the logo visible at all 
times, one question was presented per page (Appendix 5a/b).  Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues’ (2001) AQ was included between the two sets of vignettes as a distractor 
task. 
 
Upon completion of the computerised tasks, the researcher returned to the room.  
Participants were thanked and offered a break before the debriefing interview was 
conducted.  This included questions about how participants found the task, their 
beliefs regarding the purpose of the tasks, and whether they might have answered 
differently if anyone had been observing them.  The researcher reviewed 
participants’ survey answers with them, to allow for greater depth regarding their 
thinking in each case.  They were again invited to ask any further questions and 
make comments about the study. 
 
Once all tasks were complete, participants were reimbursed for their expenses and 
time.  The sessions lasted between two to two and a half hours for new participants 
and one to two hours for previous participants. 
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2.5 Data Analysis 
2.5.1 Quantitative Evaluation of the pilot survey 
The current study piloted the survey in order to assess its utility as a test of social 
evaluation behaviours, incorporating visual cues previously found to be associated 
with the ‘observer effect’.  To evaluate this tool for use in quantitative research, 
descriptive statistics will be reported in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5.1.1 Power and sampling for the social evaluation survey - pilot 
When designing quantitative studies it is important to consider the issue of power, or 
the ability of a test to detect an effect if one exists in the population studied (avoiding 
a Type II error).  By convention, power of .8 or greater is generally considered 
acceptable (80% chance of detecting a genuine effect).  Conversely, it is equally 
important to minimise the likelihood of finding an effect where none exists (Type I 
error).  This is achieved by choosing a small ‘significance level’, usually .05 or .01, 
indicating that there is only a 5% or 1% chance respectively that the effect is due to 
chance rather than the test variable.   
 
However, just because an effect is statistically significant does not necessarily mean 
it is meaningful in terms of magnitude.  For this reason it is also important to have an 
idea of the size of the effect anticipated.  This may often be derived from previous 
literature.  Cohen (1988) provides guidelines for judging whether an effect may be 
considered small, moderate or large (the associated values vary according to 
statistical test used).  Using the above factors, a target sample size can be 
calculated which ensures sufficient power to find the anticipated effect size at the 
chosen significance level.  Larger samples have less sampling error and therefore 
increase the power of the test.   
 
Effect sizes for previous studies investigating the observer effect in TDI samples 
have been reported in a variety of ways but tend towards the medium range (e.g. 
Oda, Niwa et al., 2011, ƞ2 = .09; Piazza & Bering, 2008, d = .45).  The only reported 
study comparing individuals with and without diagnoses of HFA/AS (Izuma et al., 
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2011) found a highly significant large effect for the TDI control group and a non-
significant medium effect for the ASD group.   
 
In order to determine the sample size needed to achieve a moderate/large effect size 
using the action evaluation protocol, three on-line sample calculators6 were used.  
Results ranged from 32 to 81 participants per group (depending upon whether one- 
or two-tailed tests would be used) based upon the following values drawn from the 
reports of studies using control and experimental TDI samples: 
 
• mean value for population (mu1) = 2.45 
• expected mean value from sample (mu2) = 3.79 
• SD for the population (sigma) = 3.04 
• Alpha = .05 
• Power = .80 
 
In light of the inconsistency of the results, a fourth calculation was run7, using  
• anticipated effect size (Cohen’s d): 0.5 
• desired statistical power level:  0.8 
• probability level: 0.5 
 
This yielded estimated minimum sample sizes per group of 51 for a one-tailed 
hypothesis and 64 (two-tailed).  These figures fell toward the mid-range of the 
previous estimates and might be usefully adopted in future quantitative studies. 
 
The sample size used in Izuma and colleagues (2011) was considerably smaller 
(ASD group = 10, control group = 11).  As an alternative strategy for increasing 
statistical confidence in their findings, a bootstrapping and resampling procedure 
                                            
6 http://www.statisticalsolutions.net/pss_calc.php; 
http://stat.ubc.ca/~rollin/stats/ssize/n2.html; 
http://www.quantitativeskills.com/sisa/calculations/samsize.php?mean1=3.79&mean2=2.45&
sd1=2.47&sd2=3.04&AllocR=1.00&Power=80&Alpha=5&Method=TwoSample&Submit1=Cal
culate 
 
7 http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=47 
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(Fisher’s exact tests) was used.  Exact tests examine all possible permutations of the 
data, producing exact results for the sample, rather than probability of finding such 
results in the population, therefore allowing confidence for the results regarding the 
sample studied. 
 
2.5.2 Thematic Analysis 
Within the field of qualitative research there may be seen an historical tension 
between producing a homogenised, group-level account versus an individual 
account.  Methods such as content analysis (CA) may be found at the former end of 
the spectrum, while interpretative phenomenological analysis sits at the individual 
extreme. 
 
Thematic analysis (TA) evolved from CA to examine “group-based threads within the 
data, rather than idiosyncratic tangents of meaning” (Joffe, 2012, p. 213).  However, 
TA aims to go beyond CA’s surface-level focus on the observable material to include 
more implicit themes and thematic structures.  As such it may be an appropriate tool 
for comparing similarities and differences in patterns of meaning between groups, 
underscored by the individual accounts in supporting extracts. 
 
Not being aligned with any one philosophical or theoretical stance, this analytic 
method allows greater freedom in the way data may be explored, and thus is 
compatible with the critical realist stance adopted for this research.  A social 
constructionist view is that a person can only draw upon existing words to convey 
their ideas, and that this maintains others in a state of uncertainty regarding the true 
meaning and intention of the speaker.  While it is important to recognise the contexts 
in which and from which participants speak, as well as the subjective filter through 
which data is inevitably examined, the critical realist stance includes the assumption 
that participants are capable of reporting their experiences and that the researcher is 
able to understand them with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
 
Verbal data from the action evaluation tasks was added to transcripts of the semi-
structured interviews.  Transcripts (Appendix 8 for sample) were assigned the 
participants’ identification codes to protect anonymity.  A theory-driven thematic 
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analysis (TA), following steps outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) was chosen 
(Appendix 9:  Audit trail of themes): 
 
1. Becoming familiar with the data 
2. Generating initial codes 
3. Searching for themes 
4. Reviewing the themes 
5. Defining and naming the themes 
6. Producing the report 
 
Although themes were generated using an theory-driven approach, grounded in the 
literature (Braun & Clarke, 2006), every effort was made to remain alert to 
unexpected or novel ideas.  The research supervisor informally verified the 
generated themes. 
 
To further ensure quality of the qualitative analysis, every effort was made to meet 
the following additional aims: 
 
• Contribution 
• Credibility 
• Methodological rigour 
• Transferability 
 
2.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was sought and received from the Research Ethics Committee of 
the School of the School of Psychology, University of East London (UEL).  
Participants were recruited from outside of the National Health Service (NHS), and 
NHS ethical approval was not required. 
2.6.1 Informed consent 
All potential participants entered into conversation with the researcher to discuss the 
aims and tasks of the study when considering whether or not to take part.  Initial 
contact with participants involved both informal (verbal) and formal (written 
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information sheet) provision of information, and was not considered to be 
volunteering.  Consent was only considered to be given when participants signed the 
consent form just prior to taking part. 
 
Participants were also informed of their right to withdraw from the research, at any 
point, without providing a reason for so doing.   Any request from them to remove 
their data from the data set at any point up to final data analysis would also be 
honoured. 
 
2.6.2 Participants’ psychological welfare 
No element of the study was anticipated to cause discomfort or distress of any kind. 
However, participants were informed that should they express distress or if the 
researcher felt at any time that a participant was distressed, the session would be 
terminated and appropriate debriefing procedures would be used.  Participants were 
given contact information for the researcher and Director of Studies and were 
notified that they might contact them following testing for discussion of the research 
or signposting to appropriate services. 
 
2.6.3 Data protection 
Data gathered during the study was only identified by the participant number and 
was kept separately from consent forms, which had participant names as well as 
numbers.  All data and consent forms were kept in a locked filing cabinet.  The 
transformed data was kept in password-protected files in the researcher’s home 
computer (used exclusively by the researcher) and backed up on a password 
protected data key, which was also kept in the filing cabinet.  Anonymised, raw data 
will be kept for three years following the submission of the thesis dissertation in the 
event that the study may be written up for publication.  In the case of interviews, the 
original recordings will be destroyed after successful examination of this thesis but 
transcripts will be kept for this duration. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESULTS 
3.1 Cognitive Test Battery 
To compare test performance between the ASP and control groups, raw scores from 
these tests were first converted to age-scaled scores for each participant to address 
the issue of age related changes within groups.  Due to small sample size (N = 8 per 
group), non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used to analyse the data with 
bootstrapping techniques (Fisher’s exact tests) to increase confidence in levels of 
significance found. 
 
Table 3.1 shows that no significant differences were found between the two groups 
for age or years of education, two factors which may affect cognitive task 
performance (Lezak, Howison et al., 2005).  Between-group performance on all 
tasks was also comparable except on the letter fluency task.   
 
Table 3.1.  Between group comparisons for relevant demographic factors and 
cognitive test scaled scores. 
 
 Control Group ASP Group Mann-Whitney 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD U Z 
Exact Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Age 
(years) 39.00 15.67 37.63 17.21 29.50 -0.263 0.816 
Education 
(years) 17.63 4.24 15.88 2.03 21.00 -1.195 0.248 
WRAT-3 
Reading 12.50 1.20 12.25 2.19 30.00 -0.216 0.854 
WAIS-III 
Digit Fwd 7.63 1.30 7.13 1.25 23.00 -0.973 0.338 
WAIS-III 
Digit Bkw 6.13 0.84 5.88 1.55 27.50 -0.489 0.725 
Working 
Memory 
Index 0.82 0.15 0.82 0.14 30.00 -0.212 0.861 
DKEFS 
Letter 
Fluency 15.62 3.62 10.00 4.04 9.00 -2.439 0.013 
DKEFS 
Category 14.63 2.33 10.63 4.75 15.50 -1.738 0.087 
DKEFS 
Switching 
(Output) 14.13 3.04 9.50 5.53 14.50 -1.858 0.068 
DKEFS 
Switching 
(Shifts) 14.38 2.72 10.13 5.54 17.50 -1.532 0.137 
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3.2 Action Evaluation Survey – Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the utility of the survey tool in comparison to previous social 
evaluation and observer effect research, the field of inquiry of this study may be 
usefully broken down into a series of small questions.  First of all, the overall issue of 
social evaluation was addressed as follows: 
 
1. How do the two groups score on social evaluation tasks? 
2. Do the groups’ scores change in association with sub-categories of social 
evaluation (referred to here as ‘domains’)? 
3. Are moderating factors, such as ‘observation’ or ‘permission’, associated with 
similar or different evaluation scores between and within the groups? 
 
The data were also examined to address the questions regarding the ‘observer 
effect’: 
 
1. How do the two groups score on social evaluations tasks, in the presence or 
absence of eye images? 
 
3.2.1 Analysis of frequency data for each group, across domains  
Each of the eight action evaluation vignettes was followed by six questions, three of 
which required ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers: 
 
• Was it alright to do the action, with no moderating factors provided (‘none’)?   
• Was the action alright if the actor was not seen or heard doing the action (‘no 
observer’)?  
• Was it okay if the actor had permission (‘permission’)?    
 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the frequency of ‘no’ answers to each of these 
questions across domains and moderating factors, between conditions and between 
and within groups.  Each question will also be addressed in greater detail below. 
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Table 3.2 Group by Condition by Moderating Factor contingency table:   
frequency data for ‘no’ answers 
 
Domain Moderating Factor 
Control Control Control   ASP ASP ASP   Both Both Both 
No 
Eyes Eyes Overall   
No 
Eyes Eyes Overall   
No 
Eyes Eyes Overall 
moral 
none 8 8 16   8 8 16   16 16 32 
observer 8 8 16   8 8 16   16 16 32 
permission 7 7 14   6 8 14   13 15 28 
                        
convention 
none 6 8 14   7 6 13   13 14 27 
observer 2 0 2   1 0 1   3 0 3 
permission 0 2 2   3 3 6   3 5 8 
                        
disgust 
none 7 6 13   7 6 13   14 12 26 
observer 7 4 11   7 2 9   14 6 20 
permission 7 1 8   7 3 10   14 4 18 
                        
ambiguous 
none 6 3 9   7 0 7   13 3 16 
observer 6 3 9   7 0 7   13 3 16 
permission 7 3 10   4 0 4   11 3 14 
                        
Sub-totals    71 53     72 44     143 97   
Totals        124       116       240 
 
 
  
 
42 
3.2.1.1 Analysis of frequency data for between and within groups, across 
domains (without moderating factors) 
In order to gauge their view of the acceptability of transgressions in general 
(baseline), participants from both groups were asked to indicate whether the 
actor’s behaviour was acceptable (yes or no), in absence of any moderating 
factors, for eight different vignettes (two per domain).  An action condemned by all 
members of each group would thus produce 16 ‘no’ responses.  The exception to 
this was with the ‘ambiguous’ domain for which there was missing data for one 
participant (ASP group, N = 7).  Thus, for this domain alone, maximum 
disapproval by the ASP group would produce 14 ‘no’ responses. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the number of ‘no’ responses given by each group, broken down 
by domain and totals across all domains for each group.   
 
Table 3.3 Frequency of ‘no’ responses per group across domains (without 
moderating factors). 
  Control (N = 8) ASP (N = 88) Difference 
(Control-ASD) Domain ‘No’ ‘No’ 
Moral 16 16 0 
Convention 14 13 1 
Disgust 13 13 0 
Ambiguous   9   7 2 
Condition Totals 52 49 3 
 
The frequency values indicate that both groups universally judged the two ‘moral’ 
transgressions as not acceptable: all eight participants from each group rejected 
both of these behaviours.   
 
Visual inspection also shows that participants from both groups gave ‘no’ answers 
at similar rates for the 'convention’, ‘disgust’ and ‘ambivalent’ vignettes as well. In 
the majority of instances, these transgressions were deemed to be unacceptable.  
Both groups’ rates of disapproval dropped to a similar extent regarding the 
‘ambiguous’ domain. (Convention: Control ‘no’ responses = 14; ASP ‘no’ 
                                            
8 As noted above, ASP Group N = 7 for the ambiguous domain. 
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response = 13/Disgust: Control = 13; ASP = 13/Ambiguous: Control group = 9; 
ASP group = 7).   
 
While the two groups tended to give ‘no’ answers at the same rates for each of 
the domains and globally, Table 3.3 also shows similar trends for both groups 
between domains.  Both groups gave fewer ‘no’ responses for the ‘convention’ set 
of behaviours compared to the moral transgressions, with the Control group giving 
2 fewer ‘no’ responses and the ASP group giving 3 fewer no’s regarding 
‘convention’ transgressions.  The difference between ‘moral’ and ‘disgust’ 
vignettes evaluations was 3 fewer ‘disgust’ ‘no’ responses for each group.  The 
‘ambiguous’ domain introduces the largest change in evaluation responses 
(Control = -7/ASP = -9).   
 
3.2.2 Analysis of Likert scale ratings for each group between domains 
(without moderating factors). 
To address the question of whether participants distinguish between the moral 
and other domains in terms of acceptability of the transgressions, each vignette 
included a request that participants rate the behaviour on a scale between 0 – 7.  
Higher scores signified greater acceptability ratings.  Table 3.4 shows descriptive 
statistics for each domain for each group. Visual inspection of the means 
suggests little between group differences on any domain, with the ASP group 
rating all ‘non-moral’ transgressions as slightly more acceptable. 
 
Table 3.4 Control group: means and standard deviations for approval 
scales, across domains 
  Control group (N = 16) ASP group (N = 16) 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Moral 0.25 0.775 0.25 0.447 
Convention 1.63 0.885 1.81 1.940 
Disgust 1.31 1.887 1.63 2.335 
Ambiguous 2.31 1.815 2.57 2.102 
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3.2.3 Analysis of frequency data between and within groups, within domains 
between moderating factors 
To examine the possible influence of moderating factors within each domain 
(testing whether the survey results would reflect the theoretical bases for the 
moral/convention/disgust distinction), frequency of ‘no’ answers was again 
compared.   
 
3.2.3.1 Analysis of frequency data for each group, within domains between 
moderating factors – ‘Moral’ domain 
Table 3.5 shows the frequency of ‘no’ answers for the moral domain with 
moderating factors.   
 
Table 3.5 ‘Moral’ domain: frequency of ‘no’ responses between moderating 
factors, by group. 
    Control ASP 
Domain 
Moderating 
factor ‘No’ ‘No’ 
Moral None 16 16 
 No observer 16 16 
  Permission 14 14 
 
 
Visual inspection of the data shows no between-group differences for the moral 
domain and its moderating factors. 
 
The data also shows no association between the hypothetical presence or 
absence of witnesses to the moral transgressions and different evaluations of 
participants from either group (‘none’ = 16; ‘no observer’ = 16.  Difference = 0).   
 
The table also shows that with when an authority figure gave permission for the 
act, participants’ disapproval rates were slightly lower (‘none’ = 16; ‘permission’ = 
14.  Difference = -2).  Visual inspection of this data shows that the ‘moral’ domain 
evaluations did not change substantially in association with moderating factors. 
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3.2.3.2 Analysis of frequency data between and within groups, within 
domains between moderating factors – ‘Convention’ domain 
Table 3.6 shows the frequency of ‘no’ responses for both groups regarding 
vignettes in the ‘convention’ domain.  Visual inspection of the data does not show 
large between-group differences for the ‘none’ and ‘no observer’ pairing, while a 
larger difference is seen for the ‘none’ and ‘permission’ pair.  Within both groups, 
however, ‘no observer’ and ‘permission’ are both associated with substantially 
fewer ‘no’ answers regarding the behaviours in this domain set.   
 
Table 3.6 ‘Convention’ domain: frequency of ‘no’ responses between 
moderating factors, by group 
    Control ASP 
Domain 
Moderating 
factor ‘No’ ‘No’ 
Convention None 14 13 
 No observer 2 1 
  Permission 2 6 
 
The hypothetical absence of witnesses to the acts resulted in 12 fewer ‘no’ 
responses for these vignettes for each group, indicating that this moderator made 
the transgression more acceptable.  The ‘permission’ moderator was also 
associated with 12 fewer ‘no’ responses for the Control group.  However, with the 
ASP group, ‘permission’ was still associated with 6 ‘no’ responses, indicating that 
despite this moderator, some members of this group continued to find the 
transgressions in this domain to be unacceptable. 
 
3.2.3.3 Analysis of frequency data between and within groups, within 
domains between moderating factors – ‘Disgust’ domain 
Table 3.6 shows the frequency of ‘no’ answers for behaviours in the ‘disgust’ 
vignettes.  Visual inspection of the data shows slight between-group differences 
for each moderating factor.  Moderating factors are associated with fewer ‘no’ 
responses, for both groups, to varying degrees, although the reduction was 
smaller than that seen with the ‘convention’ domain.  For the Control group, not 
being observed was associated with higher rates of disapproval than for the ASP 
group (between-group difference = -2).  ‘Permission’, however, was associated 
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with less disapproval for the Control group than for the ASP group (Control: 
difference = -5/ASP: difference = 3). 
 
Looking at within-group data, there were two fewer ‘no’ responses from Control 
participants when ‘no observer’ was taken into account, and five fewer associated 
with ‘permission’.  Thus with the Control group, ‘permission’ was associated with 
less disapproval than lack of observation. Moderators were also associated with 
fewer disapproving ratings with the ASP group, although again, the opposite trend 
was seen, ‘permission’ was associated with more disapproving ratings than was 
the lack of observation (‘no observation’ = -4; ‘permission’ = -3; difference = 1). 
 
Table 3.6 ‘Disgust’ domain: frequency of ‘no’ responses between 
moderating factors, by group. 
    Control ASP 
Domain 
Moderating 
factor ‘No’ ‘No’ 
Disgust None 13 13 
 No observer 11 9 
  Permission 8 10 
 
 
3.2.3.4 Analysis of frequency data between and within groups, within 
domains between moderating factors – ‘Ambiguous’ domain 
Table 3.7 shows the rates per group of ‘no’ responses for each moderating factor 
within the ‘ambiguous’ domain.  Small between-group differences were seen for 
the ‘none’ and ‘no observer’ moderators (Control = 9; ASP = 7; Difference = -2) 
and a larger difference appears for the ‘permission’ moderator (Control = 10; ASP 
= 4; Difference = -6).   
 
Table 3.7 ‘Ambiguous’ domain: frequency of ‘no’ responses between 
moderating factors, by group. 
    Control ASP 
Domain Moderating factor ‘No’ ‘No’ 
Ambiguous None 9 7 
 No observer 9 7 
  Permission 10 4 
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Visual inspection of within-group ‘no’ frequency data from both groups shows that 
the absence of a witness is associated with no change in the rates of 
disapproving answers compared to the ‘no moderating factor’ condition.   
 
Looking at Control group frequency data for the ambiguous domain, in 
comparison with the ‘none’ and ‘no observation’ moderators (which both had 
frequency counts of 9), when ‘permission’ is considered, group members 
increased the rate of ‘no’ answers (‘permission’ = 10; difference = 1). For ASD 
group members, however, ‘permission’ was associated with fewer ‘no’ responses 
(‘none’ and ‘no observer’ = 7; ‘permission’ = 4; difference = -3), which reversed 
the trend seen for this group in the ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ domains. 
 
3.2.4 Analysis of frequency ‘eyes/no eyes’ conditions, across domains  
Another line of inquiry of this study concerned whether embedding eye images 
into the research stimuli would affect participants’ evaluations of transgressions.    
 
Frequency data was examined to determine whether group status and condition 
would be associated with differences in numbers of ‘no’ answers and whether this 
might differ from one domain to another or with moderating factors.   
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Table 3.8 Frequencies for ‘yes/no’ items:  domains and moderating factors 
across groups and across conditions - expressed as N who say 'not okay' 
    Control ASP 
  
No Eyes Eyes No Eyes Eyes 
Domain 
Moderating 
factor 
    Moral None 8 8 8 8 
 No observer 8 8 8 8 
  Permission 7 7 6 8 
Convention None 6 8 7 6 
 No observer 2 0 1 0 
  Permission 0 2 3 3 
Disgust None 7 6 7 6 
 No observer 7 4 7 2 
  Permission 7 1 7 3 
Ambiguous None 6 3 7 0 
 No observer 6 3 7 0 
  Permission 7 3 4 0 
Totals   71 53 72 44 
 
 
Table 3.8 shows frequencies of ‘no’ judgments by group and condition, for all 
domains and moderating factors. 
 
For the Control group the total number of ‘no’ responses for the ‘no eyes’ 
condition was 71, versus 53 ‘no’s for the ‘eyes’ condition, therefore greater 
disapproval was expressed in the ‘no eyes’ condition.   
 
For the ASP group the total number of ‘no’ responses in the ‘no eyes’ condition 
was 72.  This compared to 44 for the ‘eyes’ condition, again, indicating greater 
disapproval for the ‘no eyes’ condition vignettes.   
 
Table 3.8 also provides a break-down of the within-group data by domain and 
moderating factor.  Visual inspection shows that for the ‘moral’ domain and its 
moderating factors, the presence or absence of eye images is associated with no 
difference in rates of ‘no’ answers for either group.  The exception to this trend is 
seen in the ASP group with the ‘permission’ moderator, for which ‘eye’s are 
associated with two more ‘no’ responses than the ‘no eyes’ condition.   
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For the ‘convention’ domain and moderating factors, the conditions are associated 
with small differences, although the directions of difference seen are inconsistent 
for the Control group (‘none’ difference = 2; ‘no observation’ difference = -2; 
‘permission’ difference = 2).  For the ASP group, ‘no eyes’ is associated with 
slightly higher or equal rates of ‘no’ responses (‘none’ difference = -1; ‘no 
observation’ difference = -1; ‘permission’ difference = 0).  
 
For the ‘disgust’ domain/ ‘none’ moderating factor, the ‘no eyes’ condition is 
associated with slightly higher rates of disapproval for both groups (‘no eyes’ = 7; 
‘eyes’ = 6; difference = -1).  The ‘no observation’ moderator is also associated 
with higher rates of ‘no’ answers in the ‘no eyes’ condition (for each group) than 
with the ‘eyes’ condition (Control: ‘no eyes’ = 7; ‘eyes’ = 4; difference = -3/ASP:  
‘no eyes’ = 7; ‘eyes’ = 2; difference = -5). The ‘permission’ moderator was 
associated with a larger difference for the Control group (‘no eyes’ = 7; ‘eyes’ = 1; 
difference = -6) than for the ASP group (‘no eyes’ = 7; ‘eyes’ = 3; difference = -4).  
Frequency counts for this entire domain indicate that ‘no eyes’ are associated with 
higher rates of disapproval.   
 
Data for the ‘ambiguous’ domain showed small between-group differences for the 
‘no eyes’ condition, ‘none’ and ‘no observer’ moderators, and a larger difference 
with the ‘permission’ moderating factor.   
 
Examination of the within-groups frequency counts shows a difference between 
the ‘no eyes’ condition and the ‘eyes’ condition for the Control group, for each 
modifying factor (‘none’: 6 – 3 = -3; ‘no observer’: 6 – 3 = -3; ‘permission’: 7 – 3 = -
4).  Large differences were seen between conditions in this domain for the ASP 
group (‘none’: 7 – 0 = -7; ‘no observer’: 7 – 0 = -7; ‘permission’: 4 – 0 = -4).  The 
overall trend for both groups was for ‘no eyes’ to be associated with higher rates 
of disapproval. 
 
3.2.5 Analysis of rating scale data for acts with no moderating factors, 
across and within groups, across conditions 
To explore evaluations regarding the acceptability of the transgressions (in 
absence of moderating factors), data was also collected regarding the degree of 
  
 
50 
(dis)approval each participant attached to the behaviours.  Table 3.9 shows 
descriptive statistics for each domain and condition for both groups.  
 
Table 3.9 Mean (±Standard Deviation) ratings for ‘how okay is it to …?’ 
questions for each condition, by domain and by group. 
            
  Control   ASP 
Domain No Eyes Eyes   No Eyes Eyes 
Moral 0.13 (0.35) 0.38 (1.06)   0.50 (0.54) 0.00 (0.00) 
Convention 2.50 (1.60) 1.63 (1.19)   2.13 (1.89) 1.50 (2.07) 
Disgust 0.88 (1.46) 1.75 (2.25)   0.75 (2.12) 2.50 (2.33) 
Ambiguous 1.38 (1.51) 3.25 (1.67)   0.86 (0.90) 4.29 (1.38) 
 
Visual inspection of the means for the Control group suggests a general trend 
toward higher scale score approval ratings in the ‘eyes’ condition.  The exception 
to this trend is seen in the ‘convention’ domain for which ‘no eyes’ is associated 
with higher approval ratings.  For the ASP group, ‘no eyes’ is associated with 
higher ratings of approval in the ‘moral’ and ‘convention’ domains, and lower 
approval ratings for the ‘disgust’ and ‘ambivalent’ domains.  
 
Comparing between-condition approval trends between the groups tend in 
opposite directions in the ‘moral’ domain between groups (Control: ‘eyes’ = 
increased approval/ASP: ‘eyes’ = decreased approval).  For the ‘convention’ 
domain both groups share a trend in decreased approval for the ‘eyes’.    For the 
remaining domains, both groups share a trend in ‘increased approval for the 
‘eyes’ condition.  Thus, in all domains except the ‘moral’ groups share between 
condition approval trends, although even these are not consistently in the same 
direction. 
 
3.2.6 Summary of pilot findings 
Taking into account the small sample size, nominal level data, and analysis 
limited to descriptive statistics, the values given above may only be taken as 
indicative and suggestive of what might be found with a larger data set using 
more robust statistical tests.  However, within the data available certain trends 
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might be seen. 
 
Regarding how individuals with and without diagnoses of ASPs undertake social 
evaluation overall: 
 
• Between-group comparisons of frequency counts show that in most cases, 
members of the two groups tend to rate the transgressions similarly (within 
1 or 2 points of each other), with the ASP group providing equal or slightly 
fewer ‘not acceptable’ evaluations than the Control group.  Exceptions to 
this trend are seen with the ‘permission’ modifiers of the ‘convention’ and 
‘disgust’ domains for which the ASP group gave more ‘no’ responses than 
the Control group and the ‘ambiguous’ domain/‘permission’ moderator for 
which the ASP group gave considerably fewer ‘no’ responses than the 
Control group. 
 
• For both groups, moderating factors are associated with equal or fewer ‘no’ 
responses when compared to the ‘none’ moderator, with the single 
exception for the Control group of the ‘ambiguous’ domain/‘permission’ 
moderator, which shows more ‘no’s than ‘none’ or ‘no observer’.  
 
• The degree to which moderating factors are associated with changed 
evaluations varies for both groups between domains.  The largest 
evaluation changes in association with moderators were seen in the 
‘convention’ domain. 
 
• The means of scale-approval ratings transgressions without moderating 
factors show that approval level ratings from both groups tended to be very 
low and were equal between groups with regard to the moral domain.  For 
the remaining domains, the ASP group approval rating means were slightly 
higher than those of the Control group.   
 
With regard to the ‘observer effect’ (‘do images of eyes provide relevant triggers 
for a moral judgment component of reputation management?), data showed: 
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• Overall, both groups tended to give fewer ‘no’ responses for the ‘eyes’ 
condition than for ‘no eyes’, indicating lower rates of disapproval for the 
transgressions in the ‘eyes’ condition.  Two exceptions to this trend were 
seen for the Control group who increased numbers of no’s for the 
‘convention’ domain/‘none’ and ‘permission’ moderators (the ASP group 
did not), and for the ASP group ‘moral’/‘permission’, which also received 2 
more no’s in the ‘eyes’ condition.  
 
• The most notable within-group comparisons show the ASP group to be 
unanimous in the condemning the ‘ambiguous’ transgression/‘no eyes’ 
condition (the exception being with the ‘permission’ moderator, for which 
‘no’ responses drop considerably) and again unanimous in their lack of 
condemnation for the ‘eyes’ condition.  The same trend is seen to a lesser 
degree within the Control group.   
 
• Between-group comparison of approval rating scale means for 
transgressions with no moderating factors showed that the group 
evaluations tend to change in the same directions for all domains except 
the ‘moral’, in which they diverge.  For ‘convention domain, both groups’ 
mean approval ratings drop for the ‘eyes’ condition.  For ‘disgust’ and 
‘ambiguous’ domains, both groups’ mean approval ratings rise for the 
‘eyes’ condition. 
 
 
Question 2 of this research (does the questionnaire provide an appropriate tool to 
assess social evaluation behaviour and the ‘observer effect’?), should thus be 
answered in two parts.  First, the data appears to follow consistent trends with 
regard to social evaluation for both groups.  Secondly, for the ‘observer effect’ it is 
interesting to see largely similar behaviour from both groups with regard to the 
two conditions.   However, the results in this second area are inconsistent: 
although tendencies towards higher rates of condemnation in the ‘eyes’ condition 
are seen, there are also numerous instances of the opposite.  For this reason, the 
survey in its current form cannot be seen as adequate for assessing the ‘observer 
effect’. 
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3.3 Thematic Analysis 
With the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of participants’ approaches to and 
understanding of social evaluation tasks and issues of reputation management, 
two further questions followed each vignette, requiring brief written responses 
about why participants answered as they did.  This qualitative element was 
expanded during the RVP component of the debriefing interview, which 
immediately followed the on-line tasks.   Data thus gathered were examined using 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  Although a theory-driven approach, 
grounded in the literature, was used, I was alert to new patterns within the data 
corpus.  In keeping with critical realist epistemology, themes were identified at the 
semantic level.  
 
Five main themes were derived from 13 sub-themes, encompassing 60 codes.  
Most sub-themes identified below applied differentially across vignettes and 
domains.  For instance, ‘harm’ was associated with all vignettes, though types 
and extent of harm varied within and between domains.  Likewise distinctions 
were made between how ‘rules’ were applied differentially across the moral 
vignettes as well as those from the social convention domain.    
 
Table 3.12 shows relationships between thematic categories and levels.  Extracts 
frequently fell into more than one theme group, but for reporting purposes here, 
this is avoided.  To keep the results arrangement close to the research questions, 
two organising principles were used: ‘shared’ and ‘different’. 
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Table 3.12.  Themes identified 
Theme Sub-theme Lower level sub-themes 
Mitigating circumstances Context  
     
     
     
     
  Motives Self-defense 
    Benevolent or malevolent intentions 
Consequences … Harm   
  … to society   
  … to others   
  
… to self Reputation and impression management 
Rules Universal v. subjective   
  Rules applied ‘Golden rule’ 
  Conflicting rules   
Hierarchy of authority     
Group membership Abilities and needs   
  Learning   
  Thinking style   
  Thinking processes   
 
 
 
3.3.1 Mitigating circumstances 
Across all domains and vignettes, participants from both groups said that it was 
important to consider mitigating circumstances when making judgements about 
behaviour.  Within this theme were two sub-themes:  ‘context’ and ‘motives’. 
 
3.3.1.1 Context 
When asked to judge behaviours with no moderating factor given, participants 
from both groups explicitly stated that without knowing something about the 
situation, either it made no sense, or that they felt unable to properly evaluate it.  
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A8 168 – 170:  why did he punch?  I mean people don’t normally just punch 
someone out of the blue, but so presumably there was something that led up 
to him – but we don’t know what that is.  So that would affect how right or 
wrong it was.   
 
C7 8 – 9:  the lack of background information makes choosing very arbitrary in 
some cases.  
 
 
Likewise, contextual factors could mitigate, if not completely excuse, a 
transgression.  Along with situation, a number of other contextual factors were 
also cited, in relation to the different domains.  These included ‘upbringing’, 
associated with talk from both groups about social rules as ‘learned’ (all domains); 
‘relational’ context (‘moral’, ‘convention’, and ‘ambiguous’ domain); socio-cultural 
(‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ domains). 
 
 
A3 53 – 56:  Al should know better than to tell his aunt to her face that her hat 
makes her ugly, because I was always told, by teachers and my parents, not 
to tell people they look ugly or say that type of thing as it is generally 
offensive. 
 
C2 266 – 271:  I suppose that if you raise children with that idea that if you 
want something, it’s okay to just take it then I think maybe that other views 
might …   
 
C5 295 – 297:  A child will very quickly learn that stealing is wrong, hurting 
others is wrong.   
 
 
A5 143 – 146:  we don’t know whether it’s brother and sister or husband and 
wife […/…] it might have to do with the family integrity, really.  I mean if the, 
Al, Al and his uncle, it’s a bit of a quorum against the aunt’s face and hat. 
 
C6 344:  Al's uncle will always say that, he's been married to her for 40 years! 
 
A1 228 – 232:  My dad, when he went to Thailand, he said that it’s okay to 
  
 
56 
burp after you’ve eaten your dinner because they see it as a sign of ‘oh you’ve 
enjoyed your meal’, whereas here, if you do that here, you are just rude.  And 
so again, different cultures have different ways of doing things in situations 
like dinner parties and things like that. 
 
C7 420 – 242:  I used to live up in West Virginia in the early 60’s.  Up in the 
hills, spittoons were still the norm up there. It was really like stepping back 
quite a long way in time, as is here9, in fact.  […/…] people change with time 
and something that was acceptable 50 or 100 years ago is not acceptable 
today. 
 
A6 293 – 298:  Partly, it’s just social consensus.  […/…] we just don’t show up 
in our swimming costume – unless you’re going swimming. 
 
C5 392 – 393:  It’s not really appropriate for him to wear a swimming costume 
to his lectures - universities expect a certain level of dress code (at least 
pyjamas!) 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Motives  
Curiosity regarding motives and intentions was shared by both groups, 
who spoke of the crucial role of these internal factors in understanding – if not 
excusing – moral and ambiguous transgressions.  Participants from both groups 
assumed harmful intentions regarding violence.   Different patterns were seen in 
regard to the theft scenario (moral domain). Some Control participants speculated 
about the motives of the girl, whereas no ASP participants addressed this.  
 
A6 213 – 216:  You have to tread carefully here, you risk alienating the person 
you're trying to protect. You should highlight things you think are problems, 
but be aware of your motives - do you just not like the mean person or the 
relationship?  
 
                                            
9 Greece 
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A8 168 – 170:  people don’t normally just punch someone out of the blue, but 
so presumably there was something that led up to him – but we don’t know 
what that is.  So that would affect how right or wrong it was.   
 
C3 317 – 318:  Damaging another person physically and psychologically is 
utterly unacceptable.  Without good cause. 
 
C7 525 – 526:  I think it’s one of those questions where many people will jump 
to the conclusion that what the girl’s doing is wrong.  And all I’m trying to say 
is that might not be the case. 
 
 
3.3.1.2.1 Self-defence 
The acceptability of ‘moral’ transgressions in cases of self-defence was discussed 
by some members of both groups.  However, a range of individual opinions was 
also seen within each group, regarding the extent to which the self-defence 
argument reduces condemnation. 
 
A1 266 – 267:  If you are defending yourself, then that’s fine.   
 
A2 478 – 480:  even if Rob had punched John beforehand, why deal with it 
now and spoil other people's time at the gym? Moreover, why resort to 
violence in the first place? 
 
C1 449 – 450: … you could conceive a context where stealing is okay.  If 
somebody stole from you and you stole back.  
 
C4 393 – 394:  If he was defending himself or defending somebody else, um, 
then yes, that would be absolutely fine. 
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3.3.1.2.2. Benevolent or malevolent intentions 
When discussing the ‘ambiguous’ and ‘disgust’ vignettes, participants from both 
groups considered the possible benevolence or malevolence of actors’ intentions.  
Benevolent intentions could mitigate damage done.  
 
A5 338 – 344:  if the fiancé was genuinely mean to Neil’s sister, then, um, 
obviously Neil was only looking out for his sister […/…] and there’s a 
difference between that and what you might call, ‘excretion stirring’. 
 
A6 339:  You don't know what the uncle's motives are either. 
 
A8 161 – 163:  I assumed the uncle knew the aunt better than Al did, and that 
the uncle wouldn't deliberately want to hurt the aunt. 
 
C1 237 – 241:  … If you are honest, and your intention is to actually help her, 
so that she can look less ugly [.../...]  I mean, if you really, really believe that 
you are going to do a good thing, it should be okay.   
 
C7 123 – 124:  If Mark's mother was sane, then maybe OK. We have no 
evidence as to her mental state, or her knowledge the meat was rotten. We 
must assume she was trying to off Mark. 
 
C8 393:  It would appear that Neil's actions were out of jealousy. 
 
 
3.3.2 Consequences 
Members of both groups talked about three categories of consequences of 
transgressions:  those to society; to others; to self.  A sub-theme of ‘harm’ (types 
and extent) was seen in talk by both groups when distinguishing between moral 
and other domains.  Discussion of ‘harm’ was seen at all three levels. 
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3.3.2.1 Harm 
The (im)morality of causing harm was widely discussed by participants from both 
groups.  When discussing the ‘moral’ domain, participants from both groups said 
that hitting and stealing cause harm and as such are completely unacceptable, 
although both groups recognised that there might be mitigating circumstances 
(see section 3.3.1.2.1). 
 
A1 266 – 269:  you don’t hurt people.  […/…] that’s just wrong. 
 
A6 384:  if you let kids fight, then they end up breaking each other.   
 
C6 390 – 391:  … to go back or be stagnant at a level where we are hitting 
each other is completely unacceptable … 
 
C7 536 – 554:  You don’t just go and steal.  […/…]  Sorry that sounds very 
moralistic […/…] in reality, the physical damage or financial damage or 
emotional damage you are inflicting on somebody, that doesn’t hang in our 
society. 
 
 
With the ambiguous vignettes, potential harm was weighed against other moral 
imperatives, such as that of being honest and against ‘convention’ considerations 
such as setting.  An overall pattern was seen in each group in which honesty was 
discussed as important, harm reduction was generally more important still.   How 
this played out in the two vignettes varied with both groups. In the case of Neil’s 
sister, patterns were seen in which participants from both groups said it was more 
important to protect her by being honest about the fiancés meanness, although 
some from each group said that saying so publicly could be harmful and another 
setting would be better.  About Al’s aunt’s ugly hat, participants from both groups 
said it would be worse to hurt her feelings than to be dishonest.  Those who felt 
she might benefit by being warned off wearing the ugly hat, said that she might be 
told in a gentler way. 
 
A6 213 – 214: You have to tread carefully here, you risk alienating the person 
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you're trying to protect. 
 
A8 298 – 311:  It might not be the right time.  He probably should have told her 
before that.  Clearly he shouldn’t stand up and give a speech to tell it to 
everybody 
 
A8 151 – 153:  It's more important that Al should respect his Aunt and avoid 
upsetting her than it is to be truthful about what he thought, but on the other hand 
the painful information could conceivably be helpful to the aunt in the long run.  
 
C4 193 – 194:  I would be concerned about 'ruining' the party for my sister and 
would not want to bring it up at this moment 
 
C6 158 – 159:  If Neil feels strongly about it, then he should tell her irrespective of 
the surroundings.  
 
C8 522 – 523:  Al's actions would hurt his aunts feelings, if the hat didn't suit his 
aunt there are other ways of telling her. 
 
 
Both groups evoked the key theoretical distinction between the ‘moral’ and 
‘convention’ domains, saying that the social convention transgressions were more 
inappropriate than harmful.  Potential harm within the ‘convention’ domain was 
described as disruption, offense or distress to others.    
 
A5 286 (about drinking soup from a bowl):  It would not be detrimental to 
anyone else's quality of life. 
 
C7 199 – 200:  Acceptable in terms of society is very different than acceptable 
in terms of causing any harm or injury. 
 
A4 141 – 143:  Some people would perhaps see that as not taking the 
lectures seriously.  They might think because it’s an unusual thing to do that it 
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was being done deliberately to disrupt things.   
 
C2 130 – 131:  It would be considered inappropriate and distracting to others 
to show so much flesh in a lecture theatre. 
 
 
 
For the ‘disgust’ domain, both groups were divided in the way harm was 
discussed in regard to eating rotting meat.  Some participants from both groups 
said although Mark was risking his health, this should be his choice.  However, 
others expressed a moral imperative to prevent Mark from harming himself.  Both 
groups deemed drinking spit to be a comparatively harmless, if disgusting and 
potentially offensive, act. 
 
 
A7 129 - 130:  he might have to justify himself.  But it’s still okay.  He doesn’t 
need anybody else’s justification.  If you see what I mean?  He’s not hurting 
anybody else. 
 
A8 62 – 64:  If I saw him eating it, I would tell him to put it down.  I might even 
grab it from him and take it away from him if he was a naughty boy doing 
something he shouldn’t.  I wouldn’t want him to harm himself that way. 
 
C2 300 – 301:  It isn't a very wise thing to do and he may make himself ill but 
he has every right to eat what he wants to. 
 
C7 144 – 155:  It depends whether you want people to die or not.  And 
painfully! 
 
A8 365 – 367:  if James doesn't mind drinking it and if no-one else is 
watching, than (sic) perhaps there wouldn't be much harm in it 
 
C7 386 – 388:  It’s because of the perceived risk:  people don’t like drinking 
out of the same glass that someone’s used before, they don’t like swigging 
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from the same beer bottle that someone’s used before. 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Consequences to society 
This sub-theme was primarily seen in talk by members of both groups when 
considering the ‘moral’ domain.  When discussing the vignette in which John 
punches Rob, participants from both groups shared talk of escalating violence, 
leading ultimately to social chaos.   
 
A3 70 – 72:  If people did punch each other for no reason, then there would 
be no need for communication. There would be absolute chaos.  
 
C2 465 – 466:  It wouldn’t be safe to walk around in case you got well and 
truly punched.  Um, I guess it’s just a case of public safety, isn’t it? 
 
 
However, this sub-theme also applied differentially, with one ASP group 
participant broadening this sub-theme to include talk about how social 
conventions also promote greater social harmony, while one Control group 
participant said that moral aspect in the ‘disgust’ domain (preventing harm) also 
promotes social cohesion. 
 
A5 539:  his attire in public helps set the tone for everybody else! 
 
C7 150 – 151: but basically, it’s again, a matter of social cohesion.  I don’t 
know what it is – but if you see someone about to, inadvertently, put their foot 
in the fire, you stop them. 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Consequences to others 
‘Consequences to others’ was another sub-theme common to both groups for 
vignettes within all domains.   In the ‘moral’ and ‘ambiguous’ domains this was 
described as physical or emotional distress.  This contrasted with the ‘convention’ 
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and ‘disgust’ domains where potential offense was considered.   In terms of the 
consequences themselves, this sub-theme was related to that of ‘Harm’ 
(discussed above).  In all cases, participants from both groups demonstrated 
second order ToM-type capabilities in considering both the effects of the 
behaviour upon third parties, but also in describing the beliefs the protagonists 
might hold about what others believe. 
 
A1 476 - 478:  that lady probably trusts them and probably quite friendly with 
each other and they steal something from her.   
 
A3 59:  If Al did tell his aunt to her face then she would be upset.  
 
C2 272 – 274:  Stealing is just selfish, isn’t it?  I think there’s a kind of general 
idea that being selfish isn’t good.  We should consider how what we do affects 
other people. 
 
A7 258:  he should be aware that he may upset others 
 
C4 115 – 116:  My worry was about offending the other guests at the dinner 
party rather than consuming his own spit. 
 
 
One ASP group participant, however, highlighted inconvenience to, and possible 
annoyance of, others as a likely consequence of Mark eating rotting meat. 
 
A2 293 – 308:  He should think about those who will have to deal with the 
matter when things go out of hand. […/…] aren’t people inconsiderate who 
commit suicide by jumping in front of trains?  It stops the line and everything. 
 
 
3.3.2.4 Consequences to self 
Again, participants from both groups included talk about consequences to the 
actor as well, saying that in addition to physical or emotional retaliation, 
punishment is a likely consequence of transgressions.  
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A1 109 – 110:  Stealing a possession from another person is against the law 
and you could be punished and go to prison for it. 
 
A3 64 – 68:  I also know that punching would have got me excluded from 
school. I was always told what was acceptable and that I had to follow the 
rules or suffer the consequences. 
 
C2 300:  It isn't a very wise thing to do and he may make himself ill. 
 
C5 240:  The law would have a quiet word with you around theft. 
 
 
 
A difference arose, however, with some ASP group participants also describing 
other types of ‘consequences to self’ that might ensue.  For instance, practical 
and relational considerations were raised when weighing up the vignette involving 
dress code violations. 
 
A6 276:  It would be disruptive, and cold. 
 
A8 502 – 506:  Swimming costumes don't have pockets, and Joe would 
probably need to carry a few things to the lecture in his pocket.  
 
A8 467 – 473: People don’t wear swimming costumes because it’s too cold. 
[…/…]  I suppose there’s a certain amount of educative, but it’s not done, is it!  
It’s just not done.  You would be ostracising yourself if you did that. 
 
 
 
Other ASP group participants also discussed humiliation as a ‘consequence to 
self’ in the case of ‘moral’ and ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ transgressions.   In 
contrast, Control participants tended to tell amusing stories of their own youthful 
faux-pas.   
 
A1 65:  He could get ridiculed and mocked which would upset him. 
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A6 448 – 451:  Rule systems, they are quite black and white.  And also 
because I think we’ve all fallen afoul of making the wrong call in those 
situations and got humiliated or shamed and felt awful about it.  So I think we 
associate ‘getting it wrong’ with quite serious consequences, the way that 
other people don’t. 
 
C7 253 – 261:  When I was about five years old, I was watching my father 
shave one morning, and my grandmother was living with us at the time. And I 
said to him, ‘Dad, how long do people live for?’ and he said, ‘oh, 3 score years 
and 10’. So okay.  I went downstairs and asked my grandmother how old she 
was and she said, ‘I’m 76’.  And I said, ‘Oh, Dad says you should be dead.’ 
[…/…]   She didn’t speak to him for three weeks. 
 
 
 
3.3.2.4.1 Reputation and impression management 
Of particular relevance to this study, is a special case of ‘consequence to self’:  
how others evaluate one’s actions and the effects of those judgements upon 
one’s reputation.  A question was included with each vignette to elicit talk about 
impression management issues within each story.  As illustrated above, ASP and 
Control group participants expressed awareness that one’s public behaviour is 
likely to be judged by others.  
 
The groups also shared the idea that reputation might actively be managed, for 
example, by pretending the transgression was an accident or with assistance from 
others.  Another shared pattern was that in the ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ domains, 
private engagement in ‘transgressions’ eliminated the risk of possible 
consequences for one’s reputation.  
 
A2 385 – 391:  … alone in your own house is one thing, but you know you 
might think no one can see you cause you’re in a room all on your own but 
somebody suddenly nips back in because they’ve left their phone.  Woops! 
[…/…]  if she turned it into a joke, and ‘Woops! Aren’t I a mucky pup?’ 
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A6 178 – 180:  It is about what people think of you and how they respond to 
you.  If no one witnesses it, no one knows, I think there’s no consequence. 
 
C3 176 – 178:  Whilst Mary may be from another culture and/or find this a 
perfectly acceptable way of imbibing soup in a social setting, it might cause 
amusement or rejection of Mary so it is a risky social strategy and choice. 
 
C7 343 – 350: Why create a social difficulty if you don’t need to? […/…]  
someone should, at that point, say ‘Let me get you a new glass of water’, if 
everyone saw it. 
 
 
For the ‘ambiguous’ domain and the punching vignette from the ‘moral’ domain, 
both groups said that the hypothetical lack of witnesses did not increase or 
decrease the acceptability of violations.  However, difference in patterns was seen 
with only ASP group participants speaking of the consequences to reputation of 
being seen as a thief. 
 
A5 401:  … something that would incriminate her against the neighbour! 
 
 
The debrief interview provided participants with the opportunity to talk about their 
own reputation management and the possible influence of being observed when 
making their evaluations.  This was another area of similarity, with both groups 
split regarding the influence of being watched. 
 
 
A2 41 - 47:  Ummmm.  Hadn’t thought of that, but maybe one or two of them, 
but no, I toed the party line for most of them.  Even the ones where I admit 
having done the thing myself  […/…] you know, social acceptability and 
custom …   
 
A3 189 – 196:  I do not think I would have answered differently.  My 
responses are just me and I am always telling things straight.  
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A6 115 – 116: I have to take into account how they may react and how their 
reactions may affect me.  And it’s a lot more extra work. 
 
A8 22 – 24:  I try to read what other people are thinking and I’m aware some 
Aspies can be very boring and I try to avoid that.  I’m aware that I could be 
boring if I only talk about my particular interesting subjects.   
 
C3 285 - 290:  The mere fact that I am doing a questionnaire – which is me, 
against a tool rather than a human, means that I am more precise, more 
considered, more structured, more reasoned.  And my instincts have time to 
be lost.  Whereas if I were to have to make the decision in a real time, real 
life, eye contact human situation, I would be more reckless. 
 
 
3.3.3 Rules 
Rules define not only what is right and wrong, but also provide guidance on how 
to negotiate social interactions.  This was identified as a shared theme across 
groups and all domains.  Patterns relating to the ‘universality’ or ‘subjectivity’ of 
rules were domain dependent.  Participants also stated the rules applied in 
making evaluations (including rules considered illogical, and those not the most 
relevant to the situation), and talked about conflicting rules.   
 
3.3.3.1 Universal versus subjective 
The ‘moral’ domain was described by participants from both groups as being 
governed by universal or absolute rules.  This contrasted with ‘disgust’ and 
‘convention’ domain vignettes, which were described as being subject to local or 
even personal (subjective) rules.  However, here again, different patterns were 
seen for each group in the way universality versus subjectivity was discussed.  
While ASP participants discussed universality, Control participants also spoke of 
the wider context of social rule making. 
 
A2 88: … every civilised culture agrees that stealing is wrong.  
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A6 246:  This is just theft, it's not subjective. 
 
A8 382 -383:  It still makes me disgusted, so I have to stick with my ‘no’ but 
it’s more of a personal disgust than a real reason. 
 
C1 78 – 79:  Punching someone in the face is something that is in very few 
cases, in my view, legitimate. 
 
C4 69 – 71: … a lot of the time you can get away with things depending on 
the social context, but I think that when something’s morally wrong then that 
over-rides the social context of it. 
 
C5 280 – 284:  Social situations are so culturally and societally constructed 
that there are so many different rules depending on your country, the people 
you are with, the environment.  Whereas moral rules are much more easily 
accessible cause they’re much more universal.  That is it’s not okay to take 
someone else’s stuff or it’s not okay to physically assault someone else. 
 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Rules applied 
Another shared pattern between groups is that participants stated the rule they 
applied to make their judgements in discussion of at least one ‘moral’ vignette.   
 
A7 373:  It’s not yours and you don’t take it. 
 
C3 338 – 339:  gratuitous violence is to be abhorred unless the setting and 
agreed rules permit it expressly. 
 
3.3.3.2.1 ‘Golden rule’ 
A special case of ‘rule applied’ was the ‘Golden Rule’ as a sort of empathic, moral 
compass, which members of both groups spoke of applying in moral decision-
making. 
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A1 245 – 248:  I’ve always lived by the mantra, ‘do unto others as what you 
would want them to do to yourself’. […/…]  If you don’t want others to hit you, 
then you don’t, you know, you don’t do it to them.   
 
A2 80 – 82:  How would I like it if this was done to me? If I owned something 
and a visitor put it about her person without my knowledge or consent, I would 
worry where it had gone. 
 
C7 57 – 58:  We don’t punch people because we wouldn’t want people to 
come up punching us either.   
 
 
 
Another commonality was that both ASP and Control group members also cited 
the rules applied to the ‘convention’ domain.  
 
 
A1 218 – 219: … if you are drinking soup you literally just do it with a spoon. 
 
A8 256-257:  If nobody saw Mary do it, no others would be affected … 
 
C2 525:  In England we use a spoon. 
 
C5 181 – 184:  If she is on her own then she is not under the 'social rules' for 
a dinner party so she would be ok to drink from a bowl (it’s her choice), … 
 
 
 
Another pattern emerged within the ‘rules applied’ sub-theme in which some 
members of the ASP cited unusual or irrelevant rules.  This pattern was not seen 
with Controls. 
 
A2 153 – 154:  No-one wants to see a white globule of saliva floating around 
in someone else's glass so the best thing is to drink it and remove the 
eyesore. 
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A5 495 – 496:  Depends whether the wrong was the "snorting and spitting" or  
drinking the water. 
 
A5 530 – 531:  Depends slightly on whether it were a female-type costume or 
trunks, but generally not within the spirit/ethos of a uni lecture. 
 
A8 466 – 467: … people don’t wear swimming costumes because it’s too cold. 
 
 
 
Some participants from both groups highlighted the arbitrary nature of many 
social rules. 
 
A5 115 – 118: … certain things don’t make a lot of sense.  One might say, 
‘how are you?’ for instance – which is a bit of a trite question because 
generally people don’t want a truthful answer.  It’s just a convention, a way of 
greeting people, effectively.   
 
C2 47 – 54:  I was thinking that the answers did seem obvious to me, but then 
if I look at them in a logical fashion, they don’t all have particular rules or 
constructs, actually.  […/…] it’s just like what’s the done thing in particular 
circumstances and there’s not necessarily a simple and universal logic to why. 
 
 
3.3.3.3 Conflicting rules 
The ambiguous vignettes involved dilemmas over conflicting social rules.  
Sensitivity to the conflicts was shown by both groups, as discussed above (see 
section 3.3.2.1.2 ‘Harm’).  A tension between respecting ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ 
rules and the right to decide for one’s self was also highlighted by members of 
both groups. 
 
A1 433 – 434:  It’s your own spit, it comes from your own body, it just looks 
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gross.  Medically speaking it’s perfectly fine, you know, but again, socially, it’s 
not acceptable.   
 
C2 555 – 557:  I really try to be well mannered whether I thought someone 
was watching or not.  [.../...] I suppose if she’s by herself then by my other 
rule, then she should be able to do what she likes, shouldn’t she?  She could 
be sitting there eating rotting meat straight from the bowl. 
 
C5 328 – 330:  There’s a line when your right to do something … it’s fine in 
private but when it infringes on the rights of others not to view that sort of 
thing it gets a little bit grey and fuzzy. 
 
 
3.3.4 Hierarchy of Authority  
Patterns were seen with both groups, in which authority appears to come into play 
in different ways between the domains, and may be invoked at different levels.   
 
Within the moral and ambiguous domains, the issue of authority appeared in 
discussions, beyond the question of permission.  Participants from both groups 
said that proximal permission (e.g. from the sports club or parent directly involved) 
was irrelevant regarding moral transgressions.  Permission was also generally 
deemed irrelevant in the ‘ambiguous’ domain, although it sometimes served to 
reinforce what the person would do anyway.  Participants from both groups also 
appealed to a ‘higher authority’, such as religion, the law or other established 
rules, or even the intended victim.   
 
A1 447 – 450: Even if her dad’s like ‘yeah you can take it’ you still …, you’ve 
got to think in the wider context of things.  Because stealing is wrong.  One, it 
is against the law, and morally it’s wrong as well. 
 
A6 370 – 371:  Places can't give permission to break laws or morals.  
 
C7 562 – 563: ... the physical damage or financial damage or emotional 
damage you are inflicting on somebody, that doesn’t hang in our society. 
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[…/…] you sort of go back to the 10 Commandments if you feel so inclined.  
And these things are in there.   
 
A7 346 – 348:  Neil was right to do so anyway on a personal one to one basis. 
I don't think that the parents should have influenced his views, though I 
suppose it is something to bolster his argument. 
 
C4 202 – 204:  My worry in the whole situation was whose feelings are you 
going to be […/…] affecting, or upsetting and where should permission come 
from, to do that? 
 
 
However, also within the ‘ambiguous’ domain, for the vignette about Al telling his 
aunt she her hat makes her look ugly, negative cases were seen in which some 
members of the ASP group said that having the uncle’s permission would make it 
alright to tell her. 
 
A2 414 – 415:  I picked the yes for Al's uncle because I can only imagine him 
encouraging it in a teasing way thus taking the edge off matters.  
 
A8 161 – 163:  I assumed the uncle knew the aunt better than Al did, and that the 
uncle wouldn't deliberately want to hurt the aunt. Also Al should respect his 
uncle's judgment above his own because of the uncle's greater age and 
experience. 
 
 
For both groups, the ‘hierarchy of authority’ also appeared in ‘permission’ 
moderator responses for one of the ‘disgust’ vignettes (eating rotten meat), in 
which permission from the actor’s mother was generally deemed insufficient, 
based upon common knowledge of medical opinion and evidence, Biblical 
admonitions or the law. 
 
A1 44 – 45: Eating any meat that has gone bad will make you ill. This is based 
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on what doctors and food experts have always said based on evidence … 
 
A2 301:  Your body is a temple – you should treat it with respect. 
 
C2 353 – 355:  there’s not really any proper reason why he should be 
prevented from doing it.  Except on grounds of hygiene.  If the hygiene 
inspector was there, then maybe there’s some law against it.  I don’t know.   
 
 
In contrast, where drinking spit was concerned, participants from both groups 
gave mixed opinions about whether the host had sufficient authority to permit this 
behaviour, or local social norms (or individual repulsion) should trump the host’s 
authority. 
 
A1 100 – 102:  If the host says it is ok because it is common practice in their 
country it is not ok because not everyone at that dinner party will be from that 
country and could find the practice disgusting and offensive. 
 
A5 514 – 515: … you don’t know where all the guests came from, but if the 
host says, you’d expect him to take the flack for it.  That’s another thing to 
bear in mind.    
 
C5 361 – 363:  Whilst permission/it being common in the hosts country take 
away the social aspect of this (others being disgusted) - on a hygienic level 
it’s still rather disgusting. 
 
 
 
Both groups made distinctions in their evaluations of the two social conventions 
transgression vignettes.  Opinion within both groups was split regarding whether 
Joe’s teacher held sufficient authority to grant permission regarding dress code.  
Some members of each group expressed reservations on the grounds of potential 
distress to witnesses, or dodgy intentions on the part of the teacher.  
 
A2 523 – 525:  Even if the lecturer had said it was ok, it could still cause 
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distress to those who had to watch Joe … 
 
A6 285 – 286:  The lecturer sets the boundaries in the class, although it's 
probably a sexual harassment lawsuit waiting to happen. 
 
C1 317 – 318:  If the lecturer is confident his class can work in swimsuits then 
so be it.  
 
C8 306 – 307:  I’d think the teacher was making an odd decision.  And the 
teacher is saying something inappropriate there. 
 
 
 
For the other ‘convention’ transgression, only ASP group members were split with 
regard to the hostess’ permission for Mary to drink soup from her bowl.  In 
contrast, consensus was seen among Control participants who said that 
permission would make it acceptable.  For those in the ASP group who did not 
agree, disapproval was grouped around issues of etiquette and not offending the 
sensitivities of the other guests. 
 
 
A1 35 – 36:  I have always been told by my mum every since I was a child 
that doing things like drinking soup from a bowl at a dinner party with others 
present is quite rude and contravenes social etiquette. 
 
A2 372 – 373:  Who wants to look at someone looking like an animal or a 
toddler when they've got higher capabilities than both?!  
 
C5 183 – 184:  if the host of the party grants permission than those assumed 
dinner party rules are suspended - again making it ok. 
 
 
 
3.3.5 Group Membership 
Another difference between the two groups was seen in how participants 
described their group membership – or did not.  Participants from the ASP group 
  
 
75 
explicitly expressed a sense of belonging to the ‘Autistic Spectrum’ group, as 
distinct from the ‘neuro-typicals’, while also emphasising the wide range of 
variation among people ‘on the spectrum’.  Members of the Control group did not 
explicitly express group affiliation for themselves, but some demonstrated group 
awareness. 
 
A1 215 – 218:  When I was little I actually did do that once when we had 
others for dinner.  Wasn’t a really formal dinner party, it was, we just had 
family over for dinner, but it still looked quite … luckily the other people at the 
table understood.  They knew I was autistic.  They knew that I didn’t 
understand.   
 
A3 178 – 184:  For you as a clinical psychologist to learn about the range of 
responses to social situations that people on the autistic spectrum have. It is 
such a wide range of people and we are all different.  
 
A6 448 – 451:  I think we associate ‘getting it wrong’ with quite serious 
consequences, the way that other people don’t. 
 
C2 28 – 30:  It did make me realise actually some of it’s quite illogical.  
(laughs)  And I could see how if that didn’t come naturally to you, I could see 
why you would have a problem. 
 
 
3.3.5.1 Abilities and needs 
Talk about the abilities and needs of members of the two groups was another 
pattern that set the groups apart.  As with the overall group membership theme, 
some members of the ASP group explicitly evoked the abilities and needs of 
people with ASPs.   This sub-theme was not seen with the Control group. 
 
A1 187 – 191:  … obviously there is high end function of the spectrum, and the 
low end function spectrum, so it’s probably about how people at different ends of 
the spectrum, how they deal with it and ‘cause people at the high end of function 
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can do a lot of things, can deal with things.   
 
A3 180 - 184:  My reactions are based on having learnt certain rules and doing 
role-play at home and with therapists to try to help me fit in. But other friends on 
the spectrum would not answer like me because they have not had the same 
input from parents and professionals. 
 
 
In one case an ASP group participant attributed the actor’s behaviour to possible 
autism.  Control participants did not do this. 
 
A3 131 – 132:  If Neil is autistic she is probably used to him making 
undiplomatic remarks. 
 
 
3.3.5.2 Explicit versus implicit learning 
Different patterns were seen in how participants from each group spoke about 
learning social rules.  Some ASP group members appeared to say that because 
of ‘having autism’, they mastered these lessons later and as a result of more 
effort, explicit teaching and support than it would take for ‘neuro-typicals’.  
However, one ASP participant also described instinctive dress code 
understanding. 
 
 
A1 157 – 161:  ... at school, it was mainly classes and looking at certain 
situations and how you would …  and asking those kinds of questions, um, 
and so you would have to answer and they’d say, ‘okay, no that’s not quite the 
right way’ so they would teach you the way.  In terms of at home, it would be 
like, I would do something and my mum would say ‘um no, that’s not what you 
… you shouldn’t have done that because of this.’   
 
A4 42 – 46:  I didn’t know straight away, the first time I ate around other 
people, that there were rules about what I’d do with my food, cause I thought 
it only mattered how I felt about it.  I didn’t understand that other people would 
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have an opinion on how I was eating, so I remember learning that lesson as a 
child. 
 
A1 365 – 369:  My instinct tells me that you wouldn’t wear swimming costume 
to university.  I don’t know, it’s just I suppose maybe I’ve been taught that, but 
I don’t even remember being taught that; I just kind of picked up on … when 
I’ve been in certain social situations that you wear these kind of clothes and 
you wear these kind of clothes here.   
 
 
 
Members of the control group also talked about explicit and implicit learning and 
the notion that different lessons come at different developmental stages, but 
appeared to say that these lessons are simply learned in the normal course of 
things.   
 
C5 295 – 297:  If you imagine a child at a dinner party they are not going to be 
concerned not to eat with the wrong fork or not to pick up their bowl or not to 
shout loudly.  A child will very quickly learn that stealing is wrong, hurting 
others is wrong.  
 
C8 581 – 586:  You really have to think about things in slightly different ways, 
when you are teaching [children] the right thing to do, the ways to behave in 
society, really, amongst other people.  That was a thing I got from your 
questions was it’s how we, in society we accept things as the norms, and 
often we do forget, why, how these things have got, how these sorts of norms 
have become the norms. 
 
 
3.3.5.3 Thinking style 
This sub-theme combines extracts about different styles of thinking in relation to 
social behaviours and relations.  Both groups talked about ‘thinking styles’ that 
might be considered stereotypically ‘autistic’ (characterised as ‘black and white’, 
‘rigid’, unable to access multiple perspectives, for instance).  ‘Child versus adult’ 
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thinking was also evoked by members of both groups.  ASP group participants 
also demonstrated awareness of and ability to make use of more than one style.  
 
A1 200 – 201:  Because I’m autistic, I’d look at things black and white, but I’ve 
learned to look at complex things. 
 
C7 28 – 30:  Social judgment.  […/…] given situations which I might maybe 
see variations for, but someone locked into an autistic situation might find 
extraordinarily difficult. 
 
A2 88 – 101:  Every civilised culture agrees that stealing is wrong.  I don’t see 
why an Aspie should struggle with that, unless they are like, if you remember 
Luke Jackson, the teenage boy who was writing about his Asperger’s 10 
years ago […/…]  He’d just walk into people’s rooms and take their things:  
the six siblings, the mother.  But if you said to him, ‘how would you like it if I 
walked into your room and took your toys?’ It means nothing to him because 
he’s got no sense of ownership. 
 
A5 239 – 241:  I’d be interested to know whether you think that people take 
these sorts of things for granted more in adult age or in childhood really, 
[…/…] I’d certainly say that I take these things more for granted in adult years. 
 
C7 126 – 128:  Again, it’s age related:  was he old enough to make a 
judgment?  Was he mentally competent to make a judgment?  The fact that 
he can’t make a judgment explains him doing it but doesn’t make it right.   
 
One marked negative case was seen within this sub-theme.  Along with quotes as 
above, which implied that multi-factored and nuanced social judgments do not 
come ‘naturally’ for them, members of the ASP group also spoke of using 
‘common sense’ in their decision-making.  Only one Control group participant 
spoke of this explicitly. 
 
A1 363 – 364:  I think that’s basically common sense, you don’t wear swimming, I 
mean when you’re at home and you’re on your own you can pretty much wear 
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what you want. 
 
A3 17:  I just used my common sense. 
 
A5 268:  Common sense 
 
A8 15 – 17:  To see how able I am to assess social situations and to know when 
to follow strict logic and when to use my common sense.  You know?  To what 
extent have I got common sense? 
 
C7 104:  Common sense, and consideration for others. 
 
 
3.3.5.4 Thinking processes 
Participants from both groups were able to describe their thinking process, with 
regard to their evaluations or more generally.  Members of both groups also drew 
on their own experiences to guess what the protagonists might think or to 
evaluate their behaviours. 
 
A4 158 – 165:  I remember sitting there and people walking in and maybe 
wearing something that was unusual or outlandish […/…] people would be 
thinking there was a reason for it and they would be trying to figure out the 
reason.  It’s not the swimming costume, it’s the reason that they thought its 
being done that would bother them. 
 
A6 80 - 94:  I spend, or have spent quite a lot of time analysing what people 
do […/…], and try to make sense of them and find algorithms, I suppose to 
explain them. […/…] I developed one for when someone is telling me 
something that seems unlikely.  That you don’t think that they would be lying, 
it seems out of place for them to be lying or it seems like an un-necessary risk 
for them to be taking where I ask myself what someone could gain by lying.  
It’s uh, it’s often quite shocking, the idea that you could be lied to.  So you 
tend not to accept it, but then if you can see what someone has to gain by 
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them telling you something and you believing it then … how it affects your 
behaviour and your choices, then it can make it a lot clearer.  Or at least 
highlight the risks. 
 
C4 6 – 7:  I found myself, mostly asking myself whether I was making the right 
assumptions whilst doing the tests. 
 
C6 36 – 37:  There’s social situations that I’ve been socially put in and my 
answers probably related to how I would follow it in those kinds of situations. 
 
 
3.3.6 Summary of thematic analysis 
An overview of the thematic analysis shows that important similarities and 
differences were seen in how both groups spoke about their evaluations.  
Similarities were seen across all themes, such as talk about how knowledge of 
circumstances could help to understand and possibly mitigate transgressions.  
Both groups also associated different types and degrees of ‘harm’ with different 
domains and demonstrated empathy with victims of ‘harm’.  Both groups shared 
the notion that reputation might be actively managed. 
 
A number of subtle differences were identified within domains, in consideration of 
moderating factors, such as ‘permission’.   For instance in the theme of ‘hierarchy 
of authority’, a pattern was seen within the Control group data set wherein, except 
in cases of potential harm, permission from authority figures would generally be 
sufficient to render the transgression acceptable.  A different pattern was 
identified within the ASP group where participants expressed mixed views 
regarding permission (except in cases of potential harm), but tended to accord 
more weight to the proximal authority in the ‘ambiguous’ vignettes and less weight 
in the ‘convention’ vignettes. 
 
Another difference was that, although both ASP and control group members 
considered social chaos as an eventual consequence of ‘moral’ violations, only 
ASP group members also evoked social cohesion regarding ‘convention’ 
breaches, while only control group members with ‘disgust’ transgressions.  ASP 
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group members also evoked humiliating personal consequences of social 
transgressions, thereby demonstrating concern for their personal reputation.  
Control group members told amusing anecdotes about their faux pas. 
 
Differences were seen in ‘rules’ applied to the ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ domains, 
with ASP group members evoking additional rules, which might be considered 
unusual or irrelevant (e.g. whether it was a man’s or woman’s swimming 
costume).  Further difference was seen in ‘universality’ of some types of rules in 
which Controls also talked about the wider context of rule making.  
  
Members of the ASP group described ASP ‘group membership’, as distinct from 
‘neuro-typicals’ in terms of social abilities, the types of learning involved in the 
acquisition of social skills, and thinking styles.  However, while expressing a 
sense of belonging to a distinct group for whom ‘typical’ thinking styles do not 
come naturally, a negative case was seen where ASP group participants also 
spoke of using ‘common sense’ in making their evaluations.  Members of the 
Control group, did not explicitly express their own group affiliation, but did show 
group awareness. 
 
It is important to remember that the above thematic analysis should be taken 
within the context of the historic tension within qualitative research between 
individual accounts and wider patterns of meaning.  The aim here has not been to 
produce a flattened and homogenised reading of the data, but rather to show the 
richness patterns of similarity and difference found across the individual accounts 
of participants within and between groups.   
 
As such, it is important to bear in mind that qualitative findings are not assumed to 
be transferable beyond the participants themselves.  However, across the data 
set, trends and patterns may be usefully identified and used to generate further 
ideas to be taken forward in subsequent quantitative and qualitative research. 
CHAPTER 4:  DISCUSSION 
The aims of this study were to explore how social evaluations are made and 
spoken of by individuals with and without an ASP, and if there were differences 
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between their approaches under key constraints or conditions.  The position 
adopted by the researcher was that social evaluation is underpinned by an 
interaction between neuro-cognitive processes and the environment, through 
which social knowledge may be developed and social interactions may be 
understood.  Such knowledge may be considered as simultaneously personal and 
social, and may be applied in ways that are specific to the individual as well as 
being socially and culturally determined.   
 
Further aims of this study were to explore the ‘observer effect’ and to pilot a 
survey tool intended to assess this.  Studies with TDI participants suggest that 
images of eyes can provide triggers to a moral judgement component of 
reputation management (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Kurzban et al., 2007).  The 
question of whether this is also the case with individuals with ASPs has received 
little attention from researchers to date.  To provide a quantitative measure of 
participants’ views regarding the influence of observation upon acceptability of 
behaviour in the different situations, participants were asked to re-evaluate 
whether the behaviours were acceptable in consideration of an ‘observation’ 
moderating factor.  If ‘convention’ violations are mere breaches of social norms 
and rules, with no tangible victims, it might be expected that private engagement 
in such behaviours might be judged less harshly. 
 
The current research primarily addressed the following question: 
1. How do members of each group talk about their social evaluation 
processes? 
 
Secondary questions were: 
a) How do individuals with and without diagnoses of HFA or AS perform on 
social evaluation tasks? 
b) Do surveillance cues (such as an image of eyes facing in one’s direction) 
provide triggers to reputation management for individuals with and without 
ASPs as well as TDI individuals? 
c) Does the survey tool reflect the effect of surveillance cues, if there are any? 
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The main findings with regard to each of these questions will be presented, with 
reference to theory and previous research.  To address issues of social 
evaluation, quantitative results will be discussed first.  Qualitative findings for the 
primary question will necessarily include discussion of question a).  To address 
the observer effect, reputation management and whether the survey tool is 
adequate, again discussion of the quantitative findings will be followed qualitative 
findings.  The limitations will be discussed throughout the chapter and 
summarised prior to the Critical Review sub-chapter. Clinical and future research 
implications, followed by personal reflections section will close the chapter.  
 
4.2 Social evaluation results - How do individuals with and without 
diagnoses of HFA or AS perform on social evaluation tasks?   
4.2.1 Quantitative findings – frequency data   
Frequency data suggests that both groups made comparable evaluations 
between all four domains in absence of moderators.   Comparisons between-
domains indicate that, in line with previous findings (Nichols, 2002; Zalla et al. 
2011), both groups appear to rate the ‘moral’ domain behaviours as unacceptable 
even with moderators, while moderators appeared to increase the acceptability of 
‘convention’ transgressions.   Such findings would conform to a body of evidence 
suggesting that individuals with HFA or AS perform comparably to TDI individuals 
in tasks of basic moral reasoning, as illustrated by the theorised ‘moral’ and 
‘convention’ distinction  (e.g. Blair, 1996; Leslie et al. 2006; Zalla et al., 2011). 
 
The frequency data further appear to suggest little-to-no within-group differences 
between ‘moral’ and ‘disgust’ domain behaviours, the latter of which also 
remained unacceptable even when considering moderators.  This would be 
consistent with Nichols (2002), and Zalla and colleagues (2011) whose two 
groups also evaluated ‘convention’ transgressions as more ‘authority’ contingent10 
than ‘moral’ or ‘disgust’ transgression.  Scale ratings of ‘seriousness’ 
(acceptability) will be discussed below. 
 
                                            
10 Zalla and colleagues did not include an ‘observation’ moderator in their study. 
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In contrast to Zalla and colleagues (2011), who showed no between-group 
differences regarding ‘permission’ in any domain, the current results point to a 
trend for the ‘permission’ moderator of the ‘convention’ domain, with members of 
the ASP group giving more ‘no’ (the behaviour remains unacceptable) answers 
than Controls.  This would suggest that while, in line with predictions by Smetana 
and Braeges (1990), ASP participants rated ‘convention’ transgressions as more 
‘permission’ contingent than ‘moral’ transgressions, they did so to a lesser extent 
than the Control group.   
 
A number of factors might account for this difference.  One possibility is that this 
could be a sample size artefact that might disappear with a larger group.  
Alternatively, it may be that, in contrast to controls, some ASP members did not 
consider that (in absence of further information) permission trumps the basic 
interdiction in this domain.  Frith and Frith (2008b) hypothesise that individuals 
with an ASP might be relying upon more explicit, conscious processing routes 
when engaging in social evaluation.  It has also been proposed that explicit routes 
are limited in terms of how many variables may be weighed simultaneously, and 
that the role of affect is to assist in prioritising some variables over others to 
facilitate decision making in the broadest sense (Damasio, 1994).  If this is so, 
perhaps ‘convention’ transgressions, which are theorised to lack an affective 
component (Blair, 1992; Nichols, 2002), force a return to a default position that 
transgressions are unacceptable, full stop.  This might suggest that individuals 
without an ASP might implicitly access a sort of non-affect based heuristic 
hierarchy enabling them to determine that, for instance, permission overrides the 
basic prohibition. 
 
The ‘ambiguous’ domain in this study is an innovation with regard to previous 
protocols and thus cannot be directly compared to earlier findings.  It is designed 
to create a conflict between ‘moral’ rules about honesty and ‘convention rules’ 
about setting.  As such, these vignettes do not aim to elicit easily determined 
evaluations.  There are no ‘right’ answers in the absolute and thus subjective and 
idiosyncratic evaluations would be anticipated from members of both groups.   
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Evaluations for this domain appeared to be comparable between groups, again 
except regarding the ‘permission’ moderator.   
 
The reverse pattern to that seen in ‘convention/permission’ was seen in the 
‘ambiguous’ domain.  ASP group participants gave fewer ‘no’ responses in 
association with the ‘permission’ moderator than Controls.  One possible 
explanation might be that some ASP participants might have given weight to 2nd 
party opinions in making their ‘ambiguous’ domain evaluations, while this 
moderator was associated with little to no change in Control group evaluations.   
Bartlett (2010) noted that, despite performing comparably to controls on 
quantitative social coordination tasks, her participants with ASPs expressed a lack 
of confidence in their social skills. It is possible that a similar lack of confidence, 
when faced with more complex social evaluation scenarios, might explain the 
current findings.  This raises a question of how a lack of social confidence might 
be understood within the context of the wider cultural narrative concerning the 
(lack of) social abilities of individuals with ASPs, with clinical implications, which 
will be discussed below (section 4.8). 
 
4.2.2 Quantitative findings - acceptability scale data 
Following the protocol used by Nichols (2002), a Likert scale was used to address 
the degree of ‘acceptability’ of behaviours in absence of moderating factors.  
Means and standard deviations were calculated for each group.  Although, 
inferential statistics are not reported for the current study, the groups’ means for 
each domain do not appear to indicate between-group differences. This appears 
to contrast with Zalla and colleagues’ (2011), who found that ASP group 
participants rated ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ transgressions as significantly more 
serious than controls did.  
 
Within-group ratings between domains, however, suggest that both Control and 
ASP group members appear to distinguish between the ‘moral’ and all other 
domains in terms of how acceptable they found the behaviours. ‘Moral’ 
transgressions were given lower ratings than those from the other domains.  
‘Disgust’ rating means were lower than, but much closer to, ‘Convention’ ratings. 
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This trend would appear to conform in part to findings by Zalla and colleagues 
(2011), who found significant differences between the ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’ 
domain means with the TDI group, but not with the HFA/AS group, highlighting 
the need for further theoretical and experimental work regarding the distinction 
between these domains.  
 
4.2.3 Qualitative findings - question 1 
An overview of the thematic analysis shows that important similarities and 
differences were identified in the ways the two groups talked about the social 
evaluations they made.  
 
4.2.3.1 Mitigating circumstances 
A general recognition of the complexities of social interactions was seen in talk by 
both groups.  In this regard, knowledge of the situation and the cultural, relational 
and other contextual factors in which the transgressions occurred, appeared to be 
considered important in reaching a fair evaluation of the behaviour.  Moreover, 
different types of mitigating circumstances, or different combinations thereof, 
appeared to be associated with the different domains.  For instance, while 
‘upbringing’ and ‘education’ were seen in all domains, ‘relational’ context was 
spoken of by members of both groups in regard to the ‘moral’, ‘convention’, 
‘ambiguous’ transgressions.  ‘Socio-cultural’ factors and ’norms’ were spoken of in 
regard to ‘convention’ and ‘disgust’.  Although grounded theory method was not 
employed in the current study, such evidence might provide a base for theoretical 
refinement in the area of social evaluation.  This could be an area for an 
alternative analysis of the current data. 
 
Consistent with previous findings with regard to moral transgressions (Hollos et 
al., 1986; Snarey et al., 1985; Song et al., 1987), hitting and stealing, and causing 
emotional harm without provocation, were said to be unacceptable.  In this sense, 
the ‘motives’ sub-theme identified in talk by members of both groups appeared to 
be a crucial factor, especially in evaluating the ‘moral’ vignettes.  Because of the 
‘moral’ element in the ambiguous domain vignettes, ‘motives’ (and more 
especially, assumed ‘benevolence or malevolence’ of protagonists’ intentions), 
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might have aided in weighing the two transgressions against each other.  
However, ‘motives’ was also seen in connection to the other two domains when 
potential harmful consequences were discussed.  On the basis of these findings, 
one might hypothesise that differences between TDIs and high functioning 
individuals with ASPs, in terms of ability to engage in sophisticated, multi-factorial 
social information processing, may in some case be smaller than generally 
assumed.  This might be explored through further qualitative research and tested 
using quantitative methods. 
  
4.2.3.2 Consequences 
A theme that was identified across all domains, in talk from participants from both 
groups, was ‘consequences’.  A primary category of ‘consequences’ was the sub-
theme of ‘harm’ (which might result from the behaviour).  Further patterns of 
‘consequences’ talk involved considerations locating the harm.  Harmful 
consequences were identified at different levels:  to society, to others, to the 
protagonist.  A special case of ‘consequences to self’, regarding reputation, will be 
discussed in relation to the second research question for this study (section 
4.3.2). 
 
4.2.3.2.1 Harm 
Members of both groups dealt in a sub-theme of ‘harm’, which appeared to reflect 
distinctions between the domains, as predicted theoretically (e.g. Piaget, 1932; 
Kohlberg, 1977) and supported empirically (e.g. Blair, 1996; Nichols, 2002; Zalla 
et al., 2011).  Types and degrees of harm appeared to be among the most 
important factors to consider when evaluating transgressions.  Participants from 
both groups described ‘convention’ transgressions as more inappropriate than 
harmful - although some participants did also speak of milder forms of potential 
harm, such as distress to others or damage to the protagonist’ reputation (see 
below for the latter).  This also indicates the need for further work regarding basic 
conceptualisation of the ‘moral’/’convention’ distinction in terms of victimisation, as 
suggested above.   
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Nichols’ (2002) ‘norms with feeling’ theory does not claim to account for a 
‘moral’/‘disgust’ distinction.  The use of the RVP in the current study, however, 
provided opportunities for participants to talk about the bases for their distinctions.  
‘Harm’ appeared to be the distinguishing feature of ‘moral’ transgressions.  With 
the ‘disgust’ domain, members of both groups evoked a hygiene risk to the 
protagonist’s health (which, as potential harm, might be construed as a specific 
type of ‘affect trigger’), which they said influenced their evaluation of the rotting 
meat scenario and, to a lesser extent, of drinking spit.  
 
4.2.3.2.2.1 Consequences to society 
Societal consequences, such as anarchy, were evoked by members of both 
groups as reasons why ‘moral’ transgressions are forbidden.  Similar talk about 
social cohesion was seen from Control (but not ASP) group participants in regard 
to harm prevention within the ‘disgust’ domain.  Only ASP group participants gave 
social harmony as a reason for respecting social conventions.  This is interesting, 
given that facilitation of social interactions may be the raison d’être for social 
norms.  One hypothesis might be that this could be so deeply engrained within 
most typically developed individuals that it becomes implicitly understood, 
whereas for individuals who struggle with the subtleties of social rules may need 
to hold such knowledge more explicitly.  This may be an area for further 
qualitative and quantitative study. 
  
4.2.3.2.2.2 … to others 
Extracts from the ‘consequences to others’ lower-level sub-theme appear to show 
participants from both groups adopting various empathic second and third person 
perspectives when talking about their evaluations.  These findings would present 
a challenge to ToM theories of autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995) which explain the 
difficulties experienced by people with ASPs as deficits in ToM.  The findings 
might, however, provide support for a modular (rather than unitary) explanation of 
ASPs (Happé, 2006), which predicts that a number of cognitive processes would 
be involved but in various combinations, allowing for individual differences. 
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It has been suggested by some that the ability to adopt the victim’s perspective 
may be crucial in the acquisition of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981) and that 
moral judgment is likely to involve ToM-like processes (Smetana et al., 2012; 
Young et al., 2007).  Other theoretical frameworks (e.g. Blair, 1992) hold that 
neither ToM nor empathy is prerequisite to the development of moral emotions.  
Nichols (2002) and Leslie and colleagues (2006) suggest that ToM and basic 
moral judgment develop independently but interact with each other.  Their 
theories emphasise two complementary components of moral judgement:  affect 
and learned social norms.  The current study does not aim to directly address this 
debate.  However, the survey tool would require the ability to adopt another’s 
perspective in order to successfully negotiate the tasks.  As such, the survey 
draws upon ToM-like capabilities within the context of more complex, multi-factor 
social problem solving. 
 
Different types of ‘consequences to others’ were described by members of both 
groups across all domains.  This appears to support the theoretical prediction that 
victimisation is a basis for the ‘moral’/‘convention’ distinction (e.g. Kohlberg, 1977; 
Nichols, 2002).  This might also suggest that refinement of this distinction might 
be necessary in that ‘convention’ transgressions seem likely to result in a lesser 
degree of victimisation, which might explain why such transgressions appeared to 
be associated with less absolute disapproval.   The findings might also provide 
support for explicit and implicit processing that might be involved in weighing 
affective responses against learned social rules, consistent with Nichols’ (2002) 
sentimental theory. 
 
4.2.3.2.2.3 … to self 
While participants from both groups spoke of harmful consequences for the 
protagonist (e.g. punishment such as being hit back, jail, social exclusion), an 
important difference was seen in this sub-theme.  ASP (but not Control) also 
participants cited practical considerations and potential humiliation in the context 
of ‘convention’ transgressions.  Although Control participants also told stories 
about their own social mistakes, there was no talk of humiliation or shame 
associated with these.  One might easily imagine that a repeated experience of 
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being singled out for ‘not getting it right’ in social interactions could lead to strong 
feelings of humiliation and shame with further consequences in regard to social 
confidence and self-image. 
   
Extracts from talk regarding the ‘disgust’ domain reflected both concrete 
consequences to health (evoked primarily by the rotting meat transgression) and 
less tangible consequences to the social faux pas element of drinking spit.  
Participant talk suggests that they may not have not conceptualised both 
transgressions as belonging to the same domain, and thus as equivalent for 
purposes of this study.  This possibility will be further discussed within the ‘social 
evaluation task’ section of the  ‘Limitations’ sub-chapter below (pp. 99-100).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
4.2.3.3 Rules 
‘Rules’ are described as the ‘normative theory’ element of Nichols’ (2002) model, 
and may shed further light on domain distinctions. ‘Moral’ rules, which govern 
negative affect-triggering behaviours, might be expected to be more absolute or 
less dependent on permission or contextual considerations such as intentions – 
e.g. Nichols, 2002) than rules regulating behaviour in non-affect-triggering 
domains.  In Zalla and colleagues (2011), ASP participants did not distinguish 
between ‘moral’ and ‘convention’ transgressions in their explanations of why the 
behaviours were wrong (tending to favour explanations in terms of ‘rules’ in both 
cases), while control participants cited ‘other’s welfare’ reasons for condemning 
‘moral’ transgressions and ‘rules’ for breaches of ‘convention’. 
 
4.2.3.3.1 Universal versus subjective 
In the current study, however, participants from both groups appeared to express 
similar ideas about the comparative universality or subjectivity of rules in regard to 
the different domains.  However, while ASP group members spoke of whether a 
universal or subjective rule applied, Control group members broadened their talk 
to include the wider rule-making context.  Taking the ‘meta’ reflective stance, 
enabling the identification and categorisation of rules applied, would require 
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conscious, explicit consideration of the topic, and members of both groups were 
seen to do this.   
 
4.2.3.3.2 Rules applied 
Zalla and colleagues (2011) correlated over-application of ‘rules’ by their ASP 
group members in the area of ‘justification’ with poor performance on a test of 
ToM.  The current study participants from both groups discuss the impact of 
behaviours upon third parties, thus demonstrating mentalizing capabilities and the 
ability to apply these in all domains.  However, the unusual reasoning applied by 
ASP members in this study again could suggest that they may have used a 
different processing strategy to reach similar conclusions to their Control group 
counterparts. 
 
A possible clue regarding a different processing strategy might lie in the largely 
arbitrary nature of ‘convention’ rules, described by participants from both groups. 
In this domain, some ASP participants evoked story specific variables (e.g. 
practicalities or type of swimming costume), rather than applying broader 
principals (e.g. dress-code is setting specific) to explain why the ‘convention’ 
transgressions are unacceptable.  This may raise the possibility that they adopted 
such a strategy to compensate for a lack of either clearly logical or affect-
triggering harm-based rules.  The same pattern was also seen talk by some ASP 
group members regarding the ‘disgust domain’/’drinking spit’ vignette, and is 
consistent with the hypothesis that they might have been responding to the social 
convention element in that the spit story.  Perhaps, in the absence of other 
guiding factors, these participants might ‘zoom in’ to the story detail rather than 
remaining at the level of broader principles.  Seen with the context of Kohlberg 
and colleagues’ (1977; 1969) developmental stages of ‘justice reasoning’ theory, 
one might hypothesise that use of such strategies by people with ASPs might be 
an indication that automatic, underlying processes are either not being engaged, 
or are being over-ridden by explicit application of knowledge specific to the 
situation.  This may be another area for further quantitative testing. 
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4.2.3.4 Hierarchy of authority 
Authority contingency is theorised as another aspect of a ‘moral’/‘convention’ 
distinction (Smetana, 1985; Turiel, 1983).  On this basis it is predicted that the 
latter domain would be considered acceptable when permission is given by a 
figure of authority, whereas the former would not.  Zalla and colleagues (2011) 
tested this in their ASP and Control groups, using a ‘yes’/’no’ question. They 
found this distinction to be made by both groups.  In comparison, qualitative data 
from the current study appears to reveal a nuance, which would not have 
appeared in their study due to the binary nature of the responses.   
 
In the current study, members of both groups said that permission from the sports 
club or father could not outweigh one’s moral obligation to not harm others.  The 
same reasoning was also applied with regard to the ‘ambiguous’ domain 
vignettes, in which the moral imperative outweighed ‘convention’ considerations.  
However, in talking about ‘why’ they felt that permission from the proximal 
authority did not change their evaluations of ‘immoral’ behaviour, participants from 
both groups cited prohibitions by ‘higher authorities’ (e.g. religious teachings, the 
legal code), suggesting that the issue of authority might remain relevant when 
justifying moral decisions.  
 
Opinions within the ASP group varied with regard to whether ‘convention’ 
transgressions are authority contingent.  While there appeared to be implicit 
recognition that these behaviours are not comparable to ‘moral’ transgressions in 
degree of harm, some ASP participants still expressed concern for witnesses who 
might be distressed by the behaviours.  Others remained committed to the original 
etiquette rule.  This contrasted with control group members who said that Mary’s 
dinner party host may authorise drinking soup from the bowl.  Opinion was divided 
within both groups in regard to the teacher permitting dress-code violations.  
Again, low-level harm (distress to witnesses, disruption of the learning 
environment) was cited by participants from both groups. 
 
Taken across domains, participants from both groups appear to suggest a sort of 
hierarchy of authority where transgressions were concerned, with ‘moral’ (and 
morality related) transgressions situated at the top, which may only be over-ridden 
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by higher authority.  ‘Disgust’ transgressions also appear to depend on a high-
level authority to give or deny permission, but in the form of scientific evidence, 
with injunctions against harm also being spoken of as highly relevant.  Violations 
of ‘convention’ on the other hand appear to be highly dependent upon proximal 
authority, and may become more acceptable when permission is given at this 
level.  Although this is largely in line with previous findings and theory, data from 
the current study appears to highlight the subtleties which might be involved in 
consideration of this aspect of social evaluation.  Moreover, the findings suggest 
that although both groups may reach broadly similar conclusions, the groups 
differed in their explanations of ‘convention’ evaluations. 
 
4.2.3.5 Conclusion: How do participants with and without diagnoses of 
ASPs perform and speak about social evaluation? 
Analyses of the data sets of the current study suggest that the performance of 
and discussion about the social evaluation tasks by participants from both groups 
appeared to be similar in many ways.  Members of both groups appeared to make 
the ‘moral’/‘convention’/‘disgust’ distinction.   However, members of the ASP 
group tended to vary more with regard to whether they made the distinction on the 
bases predicted theoretically, especially with regard to the ‘permission’ moderator. 
 
HFA and AS group participants in the Zalla and colleagues (2011) study were 
found to be sensitive to rule violations overall. However, compared to controls, 
they did not use relevant information regarding intentions and affective impact of 
transgressions in forming their evaluations. From this, these researchers 
concluded that poor performance by their ASP participants in providing 
appropriate moral justifications and seriousness ratings might be explained by 
selective impairment to a cognitive appraisal system.   
 
In the current study, talk by HFA/AS group participants showed them taking a 
variety of factors (including motives and consequences) into account when 
evaluating transgressions.  This would contrast with the above findings.  In 
common with Zalla and colleagues (2011), however, some ASP group 
participants in the current study appeared to show unusual reasoning in vignettes 
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containing a strong ‘convention’ element, and in absence of ‘harm-based’ 
variables.   
 
In line with a modular view of social cognition (Happé et al., 2006), and more 
specifically, a modular view of social evaluation, and in line with Nichols’ (Nichols, 
2002) ‘norms with feelings’ theory, this raises a question of whether, in absence of 
affect-triggers, adults with ASPs might rely on explicit strategies, such as focusing 
their attention at the narrow details specific to the task, rather than applying broad 
principles as they appear to do elsewhere.  This suggestion, while based upon a 
very limited data set, may point to an area warranting further investigation. 
 
4.3 Do ‘eyes’ provide triggers to a moral judgement component of 
reputation management for individuals with and without ASPs and does the 
survey provide a useful tool for this line of investigation? 
4.3.1 Quantitative and quantitative findings  
Evolutionary psychology would predict that “natural selection can be expected to 
have shaped human psychology to be exquisitely sensitive to cues that are (or 
were, under ancestral conditions) informative with respect to the likely profitability” 
of pro-social behaviour (Haley & Fessler, 2005, p. 248).   Studies with TDI 
participants (e.g. Bourrat et al., 2011) have shown surveillance cues to be 
associated with greater disapproval of anti-social behaviour.  Izuma and 
colleagues (2011), however, found that live but ‘distant’ observation did not 
influence charitable behaviour of ASP group participants. 
 
To assess whether social evaluations would differ in association with the 
presence or absence of ‘eyes’, frequency data from the pilot survey was collected.  
Totals for each group were compared across the conditions.  In the ‘moral’ 
domain no difference is seen for either group.  Because both behaviours were 
universally condemned, neither could be evaluated more severely.  This was an 
exception to an overall pattern for both groups in which greater numbers of ‘no’ 
answers were associated with ‘no eyes’ than with ‘eyes’ conditions.  Thus for both 
groups, transgressions were rated as more allowable in the ‘eyes’ condition, 
which appears to contradicts theoretical predications and previous research.  
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One possibility is that these findings might be due to differences between the 
actions presented in the ‘eyes’ and ‘no eyes’ condition.  For instance, in the 
disgust domain ‘eyes’ were paired with the vignette about drinking spit, while the 
‘no eyes’ story involved eating rotting meat.  While both actions elicit disgust, 
consuming rotting meat is potentially more dangerous than drinking one’s own 
spit, so it might not be surprising to see drinking spit (‘eyes’) judged less harshly.  
Closer examination of the ‘disgust’ data shows that evaluations of the basic 
vignettes (with no moderating factors) change only slightly between conditions.  It 
is only when moderators are taken into account (permission granted or lack of 
witnesses), that the frequency of ‘not acceptable’ responses go down for drinking 
spit although not for eating rotten meat.  Thus the pattern seen for the ‘rotten 
meat’ vignette (for both groups) mirrors that seen in the ‘moral’ domain.  The 
pattern seen for both groups for ‘spit’ resembles that seen in the ‘convention’ 
domain.  These patterns might be consistent with the explanation of a mismatch 
in behaviours within the domain which might have led participants to conceptually 
link them with the other domains, and apply rules appropriate to them rather than 
to the ‘disgust’ domain.  The ‘ambiguous’ domain vignettes present a similar 
discrepancy, possibly for the same reason.  It is in regard to this question that the 
value of qualitative data is really seen.  In both of these domains talk from some 
participants from each group appeared to show conceptual links suggesting this 
to be the underlying problem with the vignette matches. 
 
If this interpretation is correct, and qualitative data from both groups suggests that 
it is, this would present a confound which would damage the validity of the tool.  
Such a confound could be addressed through the use of more closely matched 
transgressions.  For the ‘moral’ domain, a pair of less extreme transgressions 
(perhaps involving lying?) could allow for a range of responses between 
conditions and within domains.  An alternative, and perhaps complimentary, 
strategy could be to double the versions of the survey so that all vignettes were 
presented in both conditions.  However, larger participant groups than those in the 
current study would be needed in order for each vignette to be used at least twice 
by each group.  Because of this potential confounding factor, quantitative results 
from this study regarding the influence of ‘surveillance cues’ must be considered 
to be inconclusive.   
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However, the finding that participants from the two groups do not differ in their 
responses between conditions raises interesting questions.  Although it cannot be 
ascertained whether or not participants were influenced by the presence or 
absence of ‘eyes’, with an adjusted survey tool it would be interesting to see 
whether this pattern is replicated.  Should it be, such a finding might present a 
challenge to the widely held view that people with ASPs find eye contact difficult.  
Between-group performance similarity could also suggest that cognitive 
processes underpinning the observer effect might be independent of those 
resulting in characteristic autistic presentations. 
 
4.3.2 Qualitative findings – ‘Observer effect’ and reputation management   
A special case of ‘consequences to self’ was identified in the qualitative data.  
This concerned the lower-level sub-theme of ‘reputation and impression 
management’.   
 
An interesting finding arising from the qualitative data is that members of the ASP 
group demonstrated awareness of reputation issues in much the same way those 
from the Control group did.  Members of both groups expressed the idea that 
reputation may be actively managed, and that observation was another basis for 
distinguishing between ‘moral’ and other domains.  For the ASP group 
participants this is in stark contrast to what would be expected on the basis of 
ToM-based theories (Baron-Cohen, 1995), which predict that individuals with such 
presentations would not be able to represent others’ mental states or views, and 
thus would be incapable of calculating the effects of their own behaviour upon the 
opinions others form about them.  One might hypothesise that rather than being 
‘insenstive’ to reputation issues, compared to TDIs, people with ASPs may 
struggle more with real-time, automatic processing of the multiple layers of social 
computation tasks involved.  This warrents further quantitative investigation.   
 
This finding also raises questions for future studies about whether such 
awareness might also be found in less able individuals with ASPs, and regarding 
the sorts of factors which might help or hinder both awareness and the ability to 
  
 
97 
calculate reputational effects in real-time in order to enhance reputation 
management. 
 
4.3.2.1 Effects of observation on own performance 
The debriefing interview explicitly asked the question of whether participants 
thought that their own behaviour would be affected by being watched.  Difference 
of opinion in this regard was seen within both groups, with some participants 
saying that they might be swayed by concerns about what the observer might 
think of them, while others categorically stating the opposite.  Significantly, 
however, ASP group members who felt that they were likely to be swayed also 
described feeling anxious about performing under scrutiny, thus demonstrating 
concern for others’ opinions of them.   
 
These findings may present a direct challenge to the assumption that individuals 
with ASPs do not attend to others’ opinions of them, as discussed in the Izuma 
and colleagues (2011) paper, “Insensitivity to social reputation in autism”, which 
concludes that their results suggest that people with autism cannot take into 
consideration others’ view of them.  It is possible that, while not being ‘insensitive’ 
to social reputation, people with HFA or AS may respond to more direct triggers 
but miss more subtle cues.  Such an explanation would again be consistent with 
the hypothesis that implicit and explicit information processing routes are involved 
in mediating the tasks of reputation management (Chiu et al., 2008; Frith & Frith, 
2008a).  Another, perhaps complementary, explanation may lie with the 
hypothesis of modular, rather than unitary, functions working together in the 
performance of reputation management tasks, as have been proposed with other 
social cognitition domains (Happé et al., 2006). 
 
Current findings also compare to Kurzban, DeScioli & O'Brien (2007, p 81), whose 
qualitative data indicated that none of their participants believed that observation 
had any bearing on their punishment decisions.  The authors suggested that this 
was due to either self-presentational concerns (not wanting to appear to be 
punishing only because they are being watched) or a genuine lack of knowledge 
of their own motives.  Either possibility might also explain those participants in the 
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current study who stated that they would not be influenced.  Cross-analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative data from the current study (applying a content 
analysis methodology) might allow for a clearer picture regarding the fit between 
what participants did and what they say they did. 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion – ‘Observer effect’, reputation management, and the 
survey pilot 
The quantitative results of the current study do not provide clear support for eye 
images as a trigger for the ‘observer effect’ in the current groups, or for use of the 
survey in its current form to assess this effect.  The qualitative data however, 
indicates that individuals with HFA and AS are aware of, and engage in, 
reputation management.  The current findings might provide support for the 
hypothesis that individuals with ASPs may be making use of different processing 
strategies to arrive at the same result as their TDI counterparts. 
 
4.4 Overarching theme: ‘group membership’  
The theme of ‘group membership’ was seen to span both questions of social 
evaluation and reputation management, and was an area of contrast between the 
two groups.  Members of the Control group, did not explicitly express their own 
group affiliation, but appeared to show group awareness.  Members of the ASP 
group, however, expressed a sense of belonging to their group, which they 
associated with particular styles of thinking, as well as specific educational needs.  
They appeared to associate ‘getting it wrong’ with humiliating consequences, in 
ways that Control participants did not.   
 
While implying that ‘thinking like neuro-typicals’ does not come naturally to them, 
ASP group members also spoke of using ‘common sense’ in their evaluations.  
This negative case suggests a similarity between the two groups, which may be 
overlooked or under-estimated within the broader social narrative about ASPs.  
 
In the current study, the critical realist position allowed for data analysis at a 
semantic level, while recognising that between-group differences in terms of what 
individual participants said may also be considered to arise within a specific socio-
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cultural context.  Thus, for example, a sense of membership (explicit or implicit) 
within the ASP group might be a consequence of being socialised into the 
statutory services system (all ASP group participants had been given a 
diagnosis), which brings a particular conceptual framework and ideas about what 
autism ‘is’.  Even those who had been given this diagnosis as adults, appeared to 
draw on this framework in order to make sense of their own ways of 
understanding and being in the social world.  The negative case highlighted 
above raises questions about this ‘accepted’ narrative regarding ASPs and 
disability, and the possible limiting effects that these may have upon individuals 
receiving diagnoses.  Clinical implications thereof will be discussed below (p. 
105). 
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that all participants were aware from the 
recruitment material that this study would be looking at performance of social 
evaluation by persons with and without diagnoses, and this information is likely to 
have had some effect on participants framing their own performance within one or 
the other category.  It is possible that if this had not been expressed in the 
information sheet or poster that this particular distinction might not have arisen. 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
Social evaluation tasks require the integration of multiple information processing 
strands:  circumstantial, cultural, relational contexts, with relevant normative rules, 
as well as one’s emotional response to the situation.  Reputation management 
adds another layer of processing.   King-Casas et al. (2005) suggest that this 
processing would mostly occur automatically and implicitly, but that automatic 
processing may be consciously and explicitly over-ridden if need be.  Frith and 
Frith (2008b) propose that it might be with precisely this automatic processing that 
individuals with ASPs have difficulty, leading them to rely upon conscious, explicit 
calculation. They agree with Izuma and colleagues (2011) who suggest that 
individuals with an ASP may rely upon alternate processing routes to arrive at 
similar behavioural results to control participants. From the qualitative and 
qualitative data it appears that both groups in the current study accessed largely 
the same kinds of social knowledge and empathic positions to make their 
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evaluations of ‘moral’ transgressions.  Differences were seen in regard to 
‘convention’, perhaps due to reliance upon explicit processing routes, which might 
lead to over-application of normative rules by ASP group members 
 
If, as suggested, the two groups might be drawing upon different strategies the 
current study could add to the evidence indicating that these may still lead to a 
shared body of social knowledge being accessed, as indicated by largely 
comparable social evaluation behaviour by both groups, seen in the quantitative 
findings. 
 
4.6 Limitations  
4.6.1 Sample 
The ASP group for this study was comprised of volunteers recruited via the 
internet, word of mouth, and from previous samples taking part in research at 
UEL.  The group is therefore affected by a sampling bias towards participants 
interested in research, active in the autism community, and having internet 
access.  The self-selected nature of the group suggests a certain confidence in 
their abilities, which may be related to previous educational and professional 
achievements, and might not have been seen in a sample recruited through 
statutory services.  All members of the group were white British with a large 
majority of men.  As such, the group cannot be considered to be representative of 
the wider British population of people with ASPs. 
 
Although the sample sizes (N = 8) were small for quantitative research (and 
slightly smaller than previous studies, e.g. Izuma et al. 2011; Zalla et al.), this 
would be considered adequate for a pilot and for exploratory qualitative research.  
To increase potential participant pool, the on-line tools were developed.  This 
allowed for participation by individuals who were not available during the day, who 
live at great distances, or who might feel uncomfortable in face-to-face 
interactions.  Half of the ASP group participants took advantage of the remote 
access to take part, as did 2/3 of the control group. 
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To further explore the issue of making sense of others’ minds, one might expand 
the study beyond the autism categories of HFA or AS, and include the use of 
additional measures specifically targeting ToM. 
 
4.6.2 Methods 
4.6.2.1 The scope of the study 
This research aimed to explore questions about which little is known.  A 
qualitative methodology integrating a pilot of a quantitative element was chosen, 
as this might allow for multiple angles to be seen.  A considerable amount of data 
was collected and although the researcher attempted a thorough examination, it is 
possible that richness of detail was lost through the constraints of the reporting 
process.  
   
4.6.2.2 Social evaluation task 
A modified version of a protocol used in previous research (e.g. Nichols, 2002; 
Zalla et al., 2011) was used to provide quantitative social evaluation opportunities 
with regard to hypothetical ‘moral’, ‘convention’, and ‘disgust’ transgressions, 
while providing a platform for an RVP.   Results from pre-pilot trials of the adapted 
vignettes suggested that participants might universally condemn the moral 
domain behaviours described.  For this reason, an additional domain of 
‘ambiguous’ items was added to the original protocol, to provide scope for 
potential non-negative evaluations and a window for comparative reasoning.  
Statistical analyses, however, suggest that this only partially addressed the 
problem.  An alternative, or complementary solution could be to use vignettes 
eliciting a wider range of judgment, such as two stories of lying for the ‘moral’ 
domain. 
 
The pilot protocol also incorporated a ‘surveillance cue’ element.  For the general 
social evaluation question, between group differences were only seen in some 
domains when moderating factors were taken into account.  With regard to the 
‘observer effect’, overall task performance was comparable for both groups, and 
where between-condition difference is seen it tends in the direction of less 
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disapproval for the ‘eyes’ condition.  As discussed above, issues of ‘equivalence’ 
and ‘acceptability’ arose with regard to the ‘disgust’ and ‘ambiguous’ vignettes. 
This points to a need for better matched transgression pairs.  
 
4.6.3 Analyses 
Due to the small sample size and very basic level of descriptive statistical 
analysis, the quantitative data may only be considered to represent the current 
sample.  Further research with larger groups may provide more generalisable 
normative data.   
 
For the TA, as stated above, many of the extracts within the data sets fit with 
more than one theme group, highlighting the possibility of alternative analyses.   
Researcher subjectivity is explicitly acknowledged within the methodological 
framework of thematic analysis.  As outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006), the 
researcher generates themes on the basis of their own reading of the data, rather 
than the themes ‘emerging’ as if inherent in the data.  For this research, a theory-
driven, critical realist perspective was adopted.  It would be impossible to estimate 
the influence that the literature, or the interaction between the participants and the 
researcher, may have had upon how data was interpreted.  It is recognised that 
alternative analytic schemes might be found.  Qualitative methods do not claim to 
generate findings which may be generalised beyond the individuals comprising 
the sample.  While this affects the reliability of the findings (Madill, Jordan et al., 
2000), it is also important to recognise that reliance on purely quantitative data 
would have missed the important finding that some individuals with ASPs are 
highly aware of, and manage, the complexities of interpersonal dynamics and 
issues around reputation. 
 
Application of other qualitative methods would allow for exploration of different 
questions within the same data set.  As stated above, one might cross content 
analysis with frequency counts to address the questions regarding the extent to 
which the qualitative data maps onto the quantitative data.  Another option could 
be to conduct a discourse analysis to interrogate the socio-political valencies of 
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the words participants used.  Foucauldian discourse analysis would add yet 
another different slant, for example to the issue of ‘Group Membership’.   
 
4.7 Critical Review 
4.7.1 Quality in qualitative research 
‘Quality’ is an important consideration in any research.  However, the criteria 
generally used to assess the value of quantitative research (e.g. reliability and 
validity, objectivity, representativeness and generalizability) are not considered 
meaningful in their current form, when applied to qualitative research (Wilig, 
2008).  A number of authors have proposed alternative frameworks for evaluating 
quality.  As Willig (2008) points out, most of them seem to address the issues of 
reflexivity, credibility, transferability, however, many of them do so from 
standpoints aligned with their preferred methodology (e.g. Elliot, Fischer and 
Rennie, 1999, within a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition or Henwood and 
Pidgeon, 1992, within grounded theory)  and thus may not be entirely applicable 
across the board for all other qualitative methods.   
 
Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) assert that quality of studies produced from 
within a realist epistemology can be evaluated in terms of ‘objectivity’ (the 
absence of researcher bias) and ‘reliability’ (demonstrated through triangulation of 
researchers and/or methods) to show how different points of view converge to 
support the analyses.  However, when applied to qualitative research, critical 
realism rejects the positivist position on ‘objectivity’ as naïve, and to the contrary, 
assumes researcher subjectivity.  Spencer and Ritchie (2012) outline three criteria 
to address core features of quality:  ‘contribution’, ‘credibility’, and ‘rigour’, which 
seem compatible with a critically realist TA.  My efforts to address them are 
discussed below. 
 
4.7.1.1 Contribution 
‘Contribution’ refers to the value and relevance of the research to theory, policy, 
practice, method or the lives of the individuals concerned.  ‘Contribution’ 
enhances existing understanding.  The current study used TA to explore the 
accounts of individual participants undertaking social evaluation tasks.   The aim 
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was to go beyond the observation of surface-level material, to a deeper and richer 
level of meaning by identifying shared and different patterns of talk, and to 
compare these to current understanding of social evaluation in persons with and 
without ASPs.  However, due to issues such as ‘transferability’ (see section 
4.7.1.4) and researcher subjectivity (discussed in section 4.6.3), the current 
research should not be viewed as an endpoint, but as generating further 
questions in light of how the data fit with previous findings and theory. 
 
The current study also has clinical and practical implications (see pp. 105 - 106), 
of potential relevance to individuals with ASPs and their wider networks. 
 
4.7.1.2 Credibility 
According to Spencer and Ritchie (2012), ‘credibility’ addresses the heart of the 
issue of validity, in particular methodological and interpretative validity as applied 
to qualitative research.  By ‘interpretative validity’ they mean how convincingly a 
claim is made and supported by the evidence.   
  
Appendices 8 and 9 of the current thesis provide a coded transcript sample and 
audit trail of how categorisation of codes evolved over successive stages.  
Throughout sub-chapter 3.3 (Thematic Analysis), extracts of raw data have been 
included in support of themes and sub-themes described.  Exceptions and 
negative cases have been included within the analysis and discussion sections to 
demonstrate that both convergent and divergent views have been attended to, 
and that alternative explanations have been considered.   
 
Themes were derived following steps laid out by Braun and Clark (2006), and 
described in Appendix 9 (Audit Trail) of the current report.  Although participant 
validation was not sought, data categorisation and the development of the themes 
were reviewed on an on-going basis with the thesis supervisor, and also involved 
discussion with peer-researchers.  However, I acknowledge that continued 
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analysis could bring further insights, as qualitative analyses are not necessarily 
defined by an end-point. 
 
4.7.1.3 Methodological Rigour 
In the context of qualitative research, the concept of ‘reliability’ (a necessary but 
insufficient element of validity) cannot be taken to mean replicability, due to the 
flexibility inherent in the research design.  While ‘reliability’ may be interpreted as 
‘consistency’ (i.e. would different researchers identify the same categories or 
themes or assign the same extracts to the same themes?), this reading of the 
term may not be compatible with all qualitative approaches (Spencer & Ritchie, 
2012).  Many, including those adopting a critical realist stance or using thematic 
analysis, might expect a degree of variation between different researchers.  For 
this reason, notions of ‘auditability’ and ‘reflexivity’ have been proposed as 
alternative meanings for reliability.  ‘Auditability’ has been addressed in the 
preceding section.   
 
‘Reflexivity’ involves not only description of the research process but also an 
assessment of the impact of the presence and role of the researcher and 
transparency with regard to values and theoretical orientation that have guided 
the research. 
 
My efforts to demonstrate awareness of and sensitivity to the numerous contexts 
that have influenced and shaped this research take several forms, such as 
outlining the epistemological position adopted its relationship to the methods 
used.  I have also attempted to make explicit the likely impact of my reading of the 
literature on my analysis of the data by identifying my approach within TA as 
‘theory driven’. 
 
In meeting the participants, I was attentive to the power dynamics that could arise 
through perception of me as a health professional.  By emphasising the 
importance of participants’ own opinions and strategies in social evaluation, my 
aim was reduce focus on me as an ‘expert’.  However, I am aware that a number 
of ASP group participants chose to take part at the university itself and that this 
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setting may have had an impact on our interaction.  I attempted to minimise this 
by emphasising their position as ‘expert by experience’. 
 
4.7.1.4 Transferability 
A fourth criteria, ‘transferability’, should also be addressed.  It is important to note 
that the aim of thematic analysis is to identify patterns across the entire data set, 
with a view to interpret the information specific to the participants involved.  As 
has been stated previously, it is therefore not the aim to attempt to generalise 
beyond the sample, but rather to use their accounts to generate theory or 
questions to be explored through further research. 
 
4.8 Research implications 
The focus in most of the previous literature has been on social deficits in 
individuals with ASPs. The findings of the current study suggest that adults with 
ASPs can perform at a comparable level to those without a diagnosis on tasks of 
social evaluation, demonstrating not only awareness of social rules and intricacies 
of social interactions, but also the ability to adopt, and be empathic towards, 
others’ perspectives.  However, the findings also suggest that where differences 
are seen it may be due to use of different approaches and/or different degrees of 
confidence in weighing multiple factors.  As suggested by Bartlett (2010, p. 79), 
“the ways in which sociability is achieved are complex and compounded with 
concepts of self-identity and self esteem”.  This question merits further 
investigation. 
 
Building on recommendations from Bartlett (2010), one aim of this research was 
to move away from a deficit-based approach, focusing on what individuals with 
ASPs cannot do.  Instead, this study sought to broaden the scope by looking at 
what individuals do and how they do it.  While continuing to use the deficits 
framework, neuro-imaging studies (e.g. Izuma et al. 2011) are starting to 
investigate how neural activation may differ between groups performing 
interactive social tasks.  A growing body of evidence supports an increasingly 
modularised view of cognitive processing (e.g. Happé, 2006) and the notion that 
there may be more than one means to the same end (Frith & Frith, 2008b).  
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Focusing on approaches employed successfully by individuals with an ASP could 
also help to move research beyond the ‘typical’ or ‘not’ dichotomy in social 
cognition, and promote models based upon meaningful difference. 
 
Findings in the current study point to the importance of incorporating personal 
accounts into research.  Considering individuals with ASPs as research partners 
in future projects would also be beneficial. 
 
4.9 Clinical implications 
The aim of this study was to explore how adults with and without diagnosed ASPs 
evaluate others’ social behaviour.  It can be seen from the results that adults with 
ASPs perform at a comparable level to typically developed adults, although with 
subtle differences.  From a clinical perspective, important between-groups 
differences appeared in individual accounts of how they approached the tasks, in 
terms of self-perception and social confidence.   
 
The second strand of this research concerned reputation management when 
engaging in social evaluation tasks.  Opinions varied within the ASP group 
regarding their general confidence in performing tasks or expressing views under 
scrutiny.  While some said that being observed would not affect their behaviour or 
decisions, others described feeling nervous and that performing in such 
conditions is ‘hard work’.  Participants with ASPs associated social faux pas with 
serious consequences, and seemed to say that social awkwardness is an 
inherent part of autism. 
 
These findings indicate that an important area for intervention might be with 
regard to how individuals with ASPs view their self-identity.  Moving from a deficit-
based discourse to one of difference is likely to be useful in support of individuals 
with ASPs and those around them.  For Sharp and Lewis (2013, p. 35), this might 
be addressed from the beginning of the diagnostic process.  They highlight a 
number of ways in which receiving the diagnosis may impact upon the person.  A 
frequent reaction they report following confirmation of the diagnosis is a need to 
re-evaluate past experience in light of this new framework.  In many cases this 
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enabled the person to “let go of unhelpful expectations of themselves, particularly 
in relation to others” (emphasis added), while adopting an active role in 
understanding and working with difference.  Having a language and a framework 
to explain their difference and difficulties to others facilitated positive social 
interactions, and appeared to promote acceptance by others.   
 
Conversations modelling such a perspective might be useful from the point of first 
contact with the referred person and the networks around them.  Over time, such 
conversations might explore similarities as well as the meaning, challenges and 
possibilities arising from difference. Clinical psychology has an obvious role to 
play here, in order to promote a more positive self-image and sense of confidence 
with regard to social abilities. 
 
Interventions such as social skills training might include sessions focusing on 
issues of impression management or distinguishing features of different social 
domains (moral, conventional, etc.) as identified in the qualitative data above.  In 
this study it has been seen that although ASP participants appear to access the 
same social rules as their TDI counterparts, they may give unusual reasons as to 
why transgressions are wrong.   Exploring how a variety of strategies may lead to 
the same end may be useful in reducing anxiety about failure in social settings. 
 
4.10 Personal reflection 
Conducting this research has allowed me to reflect upon the need for research, 
and its impact upon the groups about which we seek greater understanding.  The 
findings of the current study support the position that the differences associated 
with autism might be much more fluid than appears to be commonly assumed.  
For this reason, as researchers and clinicians, we might benefit from moving 
away from a ‘difference as deficit’ frame of reference towards ‘difference as 
different’, asking not whether or not a person can do a thing, but rather how they 
do it or what they do instead. Such a shift could help to move away from the 
stigma currently associated with difference, to promote the recognition, 
acceptance and valuing of difference. 
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Appendix 1: Literature search strategy 
 
 
In the Summer of 2011 search was conducted to identify the relevant literature for 
the development of the proposal for this study.  The search was repeated in the 
Spring of 2012 following thesis proposal approval by the department of 
Psychology at UEL. EBSCO Host was used to search the Academic Search 
Complete, CINAHL Plus, PsychARTICLES, PsychINFO databases for the years 
2000 – 2011, 2011-2012.  Titles and abstracts were scanned to identify relevant 
materials.  The following key words were used: 
 
“autism and moral judgment” = 20 + 2 
“autism and surveillance cues” = 0 
“autism and surveillance” = 249 with 1 relevant (most concerned prevalence) 
“autism and observer effect” = 0 + 3 (1 relevant) 
“autism and reputation management” = 1 
 
The resulting bibliography augmented a small collection of articles given to the 
researcher by the primary and secondary directors of studies during initial 
conversations exploring the possibility of the research project. 
 
Further literature was culled from reference sections of the articles above. 
 
Books on autism and explanatory theories by established authors were initially 
sought at the UEL library and again, reference sections provided further, more 
specialised literature. 
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Appendix 2:  University of London Ethics Committee approval letter 
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Appendix 3:  Participant information sheet 
 
Social Evaluation Project 
 
Researcher: Danielle Gaynor, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervisor: Dr. Matthew Jones Chesters, Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology 
 
Contact:   University of East London, Water Lane, LONDON, E15 4LZ 
  Telephone: 020 8223 4147    
Email: u1037623@uel.ac.uk (Danielle Gaynor) and 
           m.h.jones-chesters@uel.ac.uk (Dr. Matthew Jones Chesters) 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide whether to participate, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  If there is 
anything that is not clear, or about which you would like further information, please do not hesitate to 
ask us.  Take time to decide whether or not you would like to take part. 
 
 
 
Much of the research into the social skills of people with autistic spectrum presentations (ASPs) 
focuses on deficits and impairments.  However, there is increasing evidence (from a variety of 
sources) suggesting that persons with an ASP can manage complex social situations very well, 
perhaps by explicitly ‘working out’ the rules involved.   
 
This research is designed to examine how people with ASPs make social evaluations.  Previous 
research has been inconclusive, and thus our understanding is limited.  It is hoped that this study 
will allow us to better understand the difficulties some people describe, and perhaps allow us to find 
ways of making everyday interactions easier.  We hope that this research will be of interest to you.  
In return, we will pay you any expenses incurred (e.g. if you have to travel to us) and £10 per hour 
or part remuneration. 
  
 
 
You have been invited to take part because you recently or previously responded to a request for 
volunteers, and/or took part in another of our studies.  We aim to include adults with a diagnosis of 
either High Functioning Autism or Asperger’s Syndrome, and adults without these diagnoses. 
 
 
 
It is your choice whether or not you take part in this research.  You do not have to give a reason for 
not taking part and you can stop at any time.  You may contact the researcher or supervisor at any 
time during or after the tasks to leave the research.  If you do stop after the research has started, you 
may leave your data to be used in the research, or you may ask for it to be destroyed. 
UEL 
University of 
East London 
 
School of Psychology 
Information Sheet 
Purpose 
Why me? 
Do I have to participate? 
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This study builds upon our previous research in this area and upon our clinical experience.  It has 
been closely reviewed and approved by colleagues in the School of Psychology and by the Ethics 
Committee of the University of East London. 
 
 
 
If you have not previously taken part in our research before, this study will take approximately 2 
hours.  If you have participated in our previous research, and we still have that information, it will 
take between 1 and 1½ hours.  The study involves several different tasks with natural, short 
breaks between.  However, you may ask for a break at any time.  Some tasks will be timed and 
completed without a break, but these will be short.  You will be able to have a drink or something 
to eat, if you require, during this time and, of course, use the toilet whenever you wish. 
 
 
This study has several parts to it, some of which will be done in a face-to-face interview style.  
Other parts will be carried out on a computer.  We will ask you for some details about yourself, 
such as age, gender, education and cultural background.  If you are working with us for the first 
time, there will be some tests of attention, language skills and perception, to ensure that you can 
cope with the tests.  Then there will be the main research tasks, involving questions about  
• whether something a person did was right or wrong 
• whether or not their circumstances might make a difference. 
These tasks will involve reading very short scenarios and then answering a short series of 
questions.  Some of these will involve rating the person’s action on a scale of 0 – 6.  Others will 
ask you to give a short answer about your opinion.  There are no right or wrong answers! 
Finally, the researcher will ask you to talk about how you found the tasks and the questions that 
were asked; to tell us your thoughts and feelings on the research topics; and we will ask your 
permission to audio record this (so that we may work through it later). 
 
 
 
No.  When we have taken down your personal details, we will give you a participant number.  This 
will be the only way your data is identified.  All of your demographic information will be kept 
separately from your other data.  No one other than the researchers will have access to your 
details or answers, and even the university examiners will not know your real name.  When 
reporting the findings of the study, we will mainly talk in general terms about how people did 
overall.  If we use a short quote from you in any report, only your number will be used to label it. 
 
 
 
It is very unlikely that you will be upset by any part of this study.  However, if at any time you find 
that you are upset by the tasks, please let us know and we will stop.  If you are worried about 
anything following the interview, please feel free to contact us by post, email or phone, at the 
contact details given above. 
 
 
Who is organising and monitoring the research? 
How long will it take? 
What do I have to do? 
Will people know it’s me? 
Could I be upset by the study? 
Thank you for your interest in this project 
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Appendix 4:  Demographics questionnaire 
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Appendix 5a:  Action Evaluation Survey – sample vignette – ‘eyes’ 
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Appendix 5b:  Action Evaluation Survey – sample vignette – ‘ no eyes’ 
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Appendix 6:  Semi-structured debriefing interview schedule 
 
 
Debriefing: 
 
This section of the study is now complete. 
 
I would like to ask you some questions about your experience of the action 
evaluation task: 
 
1. How did you find the tasks you just did? 
a. Prompts – was it difficult? 
i. How do you feel about it now? 
2. What did you think the purpose of the tasks was? 
a. Prompt:  can you think of how this may be similar to something you 
may have done outside of a research environment? 
3. Do you think you would have answered differently if anyone had been 
watching you? 
a. Prompt:  how might this have been different for you? 
 
 
This final section of the study is now complete, and we would like to offer you the 
opportunity to ask questions you may have about the study. 
 
Thank you for volunteering to take part in this project.   
 
Would you be willing to have us contact you for future research projects? 
 
Thanks, again. 
 
  
UEL Autistic 
Spectrum 
Research Action Evaluation 
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Appendix 7:  Consent form 
 
 
School of Psychology 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study 
 
Researcher:  Danielle Gaynor 
Designation: Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by: Dr Matthew Jones Chesters 
 
 
   Please 
initial box 
 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided; 
     I understand what the study is about, how it is being done, and why. 
 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
     at any time, without giving any reason, and without any consequences. 
 
3.  I agree to short quotes from my answers being used in the write-up 
     of this study, and that my anonymity will still be protected at all times. 
 
4.  I give permission for the individuals named above, and examiners at  
     the university to have access to the data generated by my participation. 
 
5.  I voluntarily consent to take part in the above study  
     and consent to the audio-taping of my answers. 
 
 
I agree to the terms. 
Respondent’s name (print): 
Respondent’s signature:  
Date:     
 
I agree to the terms: 
Researcher’s name (print):   
Researcher’s signature:   
Date:     
 
 
I have received the sum of £ ………….  Signature: 
in payment of expenses and remuneration. Date:  
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Appendix 8:  Worked transcript – sample (A2 pages 1 and 2) 
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Appendix 9:  Audit trail of themes 
 
The thematic analysis audit trail reflects the analytic procedure I followed.  As 
recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), this was not a linear process, but 
rather involved revisiting previous stages and re-checking themes against data in 
an iterative fashion. 
 
Stages 1 & 2 – Becoming familiar with the data and generating codes 
From the audio recordings of the debrief interviews, transcripts were typed.  
Qualitative data from the survey was integrated at the relevant points.  The hard 
copies of transcripts were read and concepts of interest and relevance were 
identified and annotated.  While efforts were made to see each data set with fresh 
eyes, it was impossible to avoid all influence of previous material.  62 initial codes 
were thus created. 
 
Transcripts were entered into software developed for purposes of thematic 
analysis (TAMS analyser, version 4.14 © Matthew Weinstein), and initial codes 
were applied.  Data belonging to each code was collated and printed for further 
consideration. 
 
Stages 3, 4 and 5 – Searching for, reviewing, defining and naming themes 
Ideas about potential themes  
The 62 codes were grouped into nine themes and 49 sub-themes (see Tables A.1 
- A.3 for original coding scheme and related themes).   
 
Through successive culls of the collated extracts (with repeated reference back to 
source material) and the process of describing themes, new relationships 
between sub-themes and themes were seen.  This allowed me to collapse sub-
themes together and in some case to further merge themes themselves.   Several 
of the initial themes seemed domain or question specific, while a few others 
spanned all domains.  Identification of repeated sub-themes helped me to move 
towards higher order themes.  Table A.4 illustrates the reasoning behind this 
decision making process. 
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Table A.1 Part 1 of initial coding scheme 
 
No Domaine Theme Sub-theme Code Definition 
1   Authority   Hierarchy Levels of authority hierarchy 
2       Permission Is the act authority contingent? 
3   Consequences   Others 
Physical emotional, 
financial harm; offence, 
disgust 
4       Self Jail, exclusion, harm, humiliation 
5       Society Chaos, anarchy or social harmony 
6   Contingencies Motives motives 
What are the actor's 
intentions?  Related to 
moral codes, but may be 
seen in the conventional 
codes, too. 
7       
Assumed 
Altruism or 
Benevolence 
Participants' assumptions 
that the actor's intentions 
are good 
8       Harmful Assumptions that intentions are bad 
9 Social Convention   Context Cultural 
Culturally determined 
norms 
10       Family What is acceptable in one family 
11       Religious Religiously determined contingency 
12       Relational What is acceptable with particular relationships 
13       Situational Situationally determined appropriateness 
14       Social 
may encompass all of 
the previous context 
contingencies 
15       Circumstances *Broken down below as ‘context’ 
16       Education 
Has one had sufficient 
education to know 
better? 
17       Intentions   
18       Upbringing Related to education 
19       Dress code   
20       Etiquette Anything to do with manners 
21       Norms Socially determined norms or conventions 
22 Disgust     Health Risk to health 
23       Hygiene Not clean 
24       Off-putting Repulsive 
25       disgust disgusting 
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Table A.2 Part 2 of initial coding scheme 
 
No Domaine Theme Sub-theme Code Definition 
26 Morals     Moral appeal to morality 
27       Golden Rule Related to consequences to self 
28       Empathy Participant expresses empathy for one or more characters 
29       Harm 
The act is wrong because it 
causes physical, emotional, 
financial harm 
30       Rights The act infringes upon another’s rights – e.g. to property 
31       Universal Assumed to be universally applicable 
32   Contingencies   Intentions   
33 
Observer 
Effect 
    Impression management 
Awareness of managing the 
impression one makes 
34     Public Opinion Behaviour subject to public approval or disapproval 
35       Seen As Weird Related to ‘impression management’ 
36       Privacy What you do in private is your affair 
37       Own Decision Related to observer effect? 
38       Own 
Experience 
Participant relates vignette to own 
story.  
39       Can also be related to ‘empathy’ 
40 
MCDA Rules   Applied Participant explicitly describes the rule applied 
41       Conflicting 
When 2 or more rules apply and 
which trumps which (and why - 
context and contingency related) 
42   Spectrum   Abilities  What people with ASPs can do 
43       Needs  What they find challenging 
44       Identity  Self-inclusion in ASP group 
45   Thinking Style   ‘Autistic’  Assumption of particular thinking 
46       Common sense  ‘what anyone would think’ 
47       Flexible  Ability to hold multiple perspectives 
48       Rigid  Cannot see other perspectives 
49       Learned  Explicitly learned social rules 
50       Instinctive  Implicitly held social rules 
51       Black & white No middle ground  
52       Adult vs Child how participant believes a child or adult should/would think 
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Table A.3 Part 3 of initial coding scheme 
 
No Domaine Theme Sub-theme Code Definition 
53 MCDA Theory of Mind   
Metacognitive 
stance 
Ability to adopt a meta-position.  
Related to empathy and to thinking 
style. 
 54    Misc   Interaction Styles 
Say it straight; own personality.  
Related to Thinking styles - 
learned or instinctive. 
55       
Learning or 
teaching/support How did you know about this rule? 
 56         Explicit teaching and support 
57 
      Universal broader applications than simply moral 
58       Subjective 
room for personal interpretation 
with context considerations 
59       Empathy broader appl's than simply moral 
60       Unusual Behaviour no value judgment 
61       Don't know why it's wrong 
usually applies to the moral 
questions. 
62       
Vignette seems 
too 
unrealistic/inability 
to suspend 
disbelief 
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Table A.4 Sample of reworked Themes, sub-themes and codes related to 
Mitigating Circumstances 
 
Reworked 
Codes/Themes Reasoning        
Contingencies 
> Mitigating 
circumstances 
Contingencies' was renamed, as I felt this would be 
closer to the way participants talked about this theme.  
The two categories of sub-themes were retained.     
Circumstances 'Circumstances' was subsumed into a ‘Situation’ lower 
level sub-theme as they were felt to represent the same 
ideas. 
All of these lower-
level sub-themes 
were further 
collapsed as the 
'Context' sub-theme 
within the Mitigating 
Circumstances 
theme. 
Situational 
context 
Upbringing These two codes were collapsed into one lower level 
sub-theme (‘upbringing’) as they were felt to represent 
closely related ideas. Education 
Relational Relational' and 'Family' were collapsed to form the 'relational' lower level sub-theme as they tapped into the 
ways that vignette protagonists related to other 
characters. Family 
Cultural These two codes were collapsed to form the 'social and 
cultural context' lower level sub-theme as they were felt 
to represent closely related ideas. Social 
Dress code 
Dress code', 'Etiquette', and 'norms' were collapsed to 
form the 'conventions and norms' lower level sub-theme. 
Etiquette 
Norms 
Intentions       
Intensions from the 
social conventions 
and moral domains 
were combined with 
Motives code > sub-
theme of 'Motives' 
Motives       
Assumed 
Altruism or 
Benevolence 
Assumed Altruism or Benevolence and Harmful 
intentions became the lower level 'Benevolent or 
malevolent intentions' sub-theme and the further lower 
level sub-theme of 'self-defence' was identified and 
added. Harmful 
